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GOD(S) OVER CONSTITUTIONS: INTERNATIONAL AND
RELIGIOUS TRANSNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM IN

THE 21ST CENTURY
Larry Catd Backer1
I.

INTRODUCTrION

After the Second World War, the Americans, as leaders of a coalition
of victoricus nations, played a pivotal role in the making of new constitutions for Germany and Japan. 2 These constitutions were different, in important respects, from both the first set of democratic constitutions
produced in the 18th century in the United States3 and France,4 and from
the imperial constitutions of the 19th century German5 and Japanese6 Empires. Both post-War constitutions were notable for a firm adherence to
the ideal of constitutional legitimacy grounded on the foundation of the
rule of law in two senses. First, both constitutions embraced firm limits on
arbitrary use of power, that is, of the use of the state power when not
grounded in law (something like the pre-War German notion of the
Rechtsstaat),7 rejecting the monarchial, socialist and "Rousseau" styles of
1. Visiting Professor of Law, Tulane University School of Law, New Orleans, Louisiana; Founding Director, Coalition for Peace & Ethics; Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson
School of Law, University Park Campus. Earlier versions of this article were presented as part of a
panel entitled Religious Pluralism, and the Rule of Law, sponsored by the Law & Religion Section and
organized for the Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., January 3,
2007, at the Association for the Study of Law, Culture and the Humanities Ninth Annual Conference.
College of Law, the Sawyer Law and Politics Program of the Maxwell School at the College of Arts and
Sciences, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, March 17, 2006, and at the Delaware Valley International
Law Day 2005, Temple University Beasley School of Law, Institute for International Law and Policy,
Philadelphia, PA, October 29, 2005.
2. For the German post-war constitution, see Grundgesetz, Basic Law for the Federal Republic
of Germany (1949), available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/index.html. For the Japanese post-war constitution see Japanese Constitution (1946), available at http://web-japan.org/factsheet/pdf/constitu.pdf.
3. For the U.S. Constitution, see the site maintained by the National Archives, availableat http:/
/www.archives.gov/national-archives-experience/charters/constitution.html.
4. The French Constitution of October 4, 1958 can be accessed from the official site maintained
by the Assemblde National, available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp.
5. For a contemporary critical discussion, see, HERMANN FERNAU, THE COMING DEMOCRACY
(Immanuel Kant, trans., E.P. Dutton & Co., 1917).
6. For a discussion, see, JUNJI BANNO, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JAPANESE CONSTrruTIONAL SYSTEM (1995).
7. Vivian Curran has written well about the formalism of pre-war Rechtsstaat notions in which
the formal legality ot the process of state action was the focus of legitimacy and the substance of those
actions relegated to an uncontrolled expression of the will of the people through their legitimately
elected representatives. See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Fearof Formalism:Indications From the Fascist
Periodin Franceand Germany of JudicialMethodology's Impact on Substantive Law, 35 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 101 (2002). See also Vivian Grosswald Curran, The Legalization of Racism in a ConstitutionalState:
Democracy'sSuicide in Vichy France,50 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1998). For a description of an understanding
of the Rechtsstaat principle in Meiji Japan, see Nobushige Ukai, The Individual and the Rule of Law
Under the New Japanese Constitution, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 733, 735-737 (1956).
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8 Second, both constitutions embraced an ideal of constiKaiserreichstaat.
tutional law as morally and ethically bounded (something like the post-War
German notion of the Sozialstaat).9 Under both post-War German and
Japanese constitutions, a core role of constitutional rule of law ideals
vested the state with a critical role as guardian of set of foundational communally embraced moral and ethical norms that were to be protected and
furthered through the use of state power grounded in law.' ° No law could
be enacted or action legitimately taken contrary to this set of moral and
ethical norms. Taken together, substance and process elements of constitutional elaboration marked the boundaries between "genuine constitutionalism" and the imposition of other forms of governance."
But these moral and ethical substantive boundaries of post war constitutionalism were not derived solely from the peculiar will of the citizens of
the constituting state. Rather, at least the critical set of foundational norms
was to be derives, or at least limited, by a set of universal norms. These
norms were to be transnational, that is beyond the state 1 2-they were to
8. See Charles J. Friedrich, Rebuilding the German Constitution, 1, 43 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 461,
463-464 (1949).
9. German academics after 1945 emphasized the restrictions on positive constitutional law
under a variety of theories understood as natural law, unalterable by legislative will or voidable by
constitutional action, in contra-distinction to legislative or constitutional pronouncements as positive
acts of sovereign (and now limited) will. As a consequence, the constitution itself, and the positive
expression of sovereign will it represents, might itself be restricted by higher law. These principles of
higher law might be expressed in the Constitution but might not be altered by them. Together, these
would constitute the substantive or social element of state constitutionalism. See Gottfried Dietze,
Unconstitutional Constitutional Norms? Constitutional Development in Postwar Germany, 42 VA. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1956). Dr. Dietze quoted from what would become an extremely influential 1950 opinion of
the Bavarian Constitutional Court that summarized these ideals:
The fact that a constitutional norm forms part of the constitution does not necessarily mean
that a void constitutional norm is, by definition, impossible. There are fundamental constitutionalprinciples, which are of so elementary a nature and so much the expression of a law that
precedes the constitution, that the maker of the constitution himself is bound by them. Other
constitutional norms, which do not have this rank, can be void because they conflict with
them."
2 VERWALTUNGs-RECHTSRECHUNG No. 65, quoted in Gottfried Dietze, UnconstitutionalConstitutional
Norms? Constitutional Development in Postwar Germany, 42 VA. L. REV. 1, 16 (1956) (emphasis added). What, as is stressed in this article, is extraordinary in that statement, is that this notion, within a
constructed system of transnational constitution, did not need recourse to a system of religion to support the supra constitutional features of these "natural law" principles, at least until the construction of
theocratic constitutionalism with the Afghani and Iraqi constitutions. See discussion infra at Sections
III and IV.
10. See, Grundgesetz, art. 20, discussed in this respect in Arthur Lenhof, The German (Bonn)
Constitution With ComparativeGlances at the Frenchand Italian Constitutions,24 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1949)
("The guarantee goes not only to the republican form but extends to the basic rights, the concept of
Rechtsstaat,and the universal, direct, free equal right to vote in secret elections, as well as to the autonomy of the local territorial units.") Id. at 29.
11. For an early application, see Charles J. Friedrich, Rebuilding the German Constitution I, 43
AM. POL. Sci. REV.461 (1949) ("The makers of the Weimar constitution had only a weak appreciation
of the two most vital features of genuine constitutionalism: the protection of the individual against the
government(state)... , and the need for some effective scheme of dividing governmental power.") Id.
at 463.
12. For a discussion of the meaning of transnational in the context of this article, see Larry Cati
Backer, Principlesof TransnationalLaw: The Foundationsof an Emerging Field, LAW AT THE END OF
THE DAY, March 9, 2007, available at http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com.
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reflect the understandings of appropriate behavior by governments developed among the community of nations, now constituted itself in a global
system around the institutions of the United Nations. 3 And this institutional systems would be led by the great global powers-the United States,
the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union and China-that emerged
victorious form the Second World War. The rest would follow.
This form of new constitution making, of instilling substantive principles and values in a constitution, in light of the developing system of secular international human rights, became the basis for a rising system of
global constitutional legitimacy. This system was based on the creation of
norms for the limits of governmental power in the constitution of states,
based on developing international principles of conduct,14 elaborated in the
increasingly prominent organs of global discourse, including the United
Nations,1 5 and emerging systems of regional human rights systems.1 6 Conformity to these rising norms by emerging state constitutions was viewed as
the basis for gaining legitimacy and principled convergence of political systems around key governance norms in a pluralist world.1 7 States increasingly looked to international standards of legitimate state organization in
18
drafting their constitutions.
But things change. After its successful campaigns in Afghanistan and
Iraq, the Americans, as leaders of a coalition of nations, also played a pivotal role in the making of new constitutions for Afghanistan and Iraq.
These constitutions were different, in important respects, from the constitutions it helped craft a half a century earlier for Germany and Japan. Both
of these post-conflict constitutions are notable for a firm adherence to the
ideal of constitutional legitimacy grounded in the rule of law as both process (state rule through law) and substance (state organization framed by
fundamental substantive principles and values. But unlike the German and
Japanese constitutions of the mid twentieth century, these constitutions

13. The institutionalized international community has become self aware and self-referencing in
this respect. See, ICJ, Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited
(second phase), ICJ Reports, 33 (1970).
14. See Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International
Law 1870-1960 (2001).
15. See Charter of the United Nations, available at http://www.un.org.
16. See Jo M. Passqualucci, The Harmonization of Human Rights Laws: Guaranteeingthe Plurality ofIndividual Rights, in HARMONIZING LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION: CONVERGENCE, DIVERGENCE AND RESISTANCE 35-54 (2007).
17. See, Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of ConstitutionalDemocracy, 74
S. CAL. L. REV. 1307 (2001).
18. This was particularly true in places like Latin America in the 1990s. "[S]everal countries of
the region have amended their Constitutions to grant to human rights matters, in particular, a special
hierarchy with respect to ordinary laws. The current Constitution of Argentina (since the amendments
of 1994) attributes constitutional hierarchy to international treaties on human rights that are ratified by
those countries." Hector Fix-Fierro & Sergio Lopez Ayllon, The Impact of Globalization on the Reform
of the State and the Law in Latin America, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 785, 799 (1997).
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embraced a set of singular transcendent norms-those of Islam. "In Afghanistan, no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam."1 9 This system is a national reflection of an ancient
universal system of governance developed within a global community of
believers, whose moral and ethical norms, it is argued, should limit the

power of states over their subjects, whether or not members of the community of believers.
By the 21st century, political communities organized as states no
longer constitute their governance apparatus in isolation, especially with
respect to the protection of the rights of their citizens and residents.2 °
State constitutions no longer represent unique expressions of the "souls" of
nations expressed through law.21 The notion, common to 18th and 19th
century constitutions, that the government could not enlarge or otherwise
modify its power by reference to external sources, including treaties and
international law,22 has given way in the late 20th century to a different
regime of transnational constitutionalism, at least among a significant number of states whose constitutions post date the end of the Second World
War. Since the mid 20th century, a number of global systems of fundamen-

tal and limiting norms have been competing for authority to serve as the
sole source of legitimate framework for constituting states through law.
This paper examines two of the most prominent. The first consists of
the community of states organized as a single, autonomous and universal
political system. 2 3 Now constituted as an international system of states the
core of which is the United Nations system,24 this universal system has pro-

duced an elaborate set of behavior norms that effectively limit legitimate
19. Afghanistan Const., ch.1, art. 3.
20. See, e.g., MERVYN FROST, CONSTITUTING HUMAN RIGHTS: GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE
SOCIETY OF DEMOCRATIC STATES (2002).
21. On the 19th century German political theory from which this arises, see FRIEDRICH KARL
VON SAVIONY, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE (1814) (Trans.
Abraham Hayward (1975)). See also SCHMrTr, CARL, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY (1932) (Trans. Jeffrey Seitzer (2004 from first (1932) and 2nd (1958) German eds.)). See generally Michaels, Ralf, Globalizing Savigny The State in Savigny and the Challenge of Europeanization and Globalization (Durham,
NC: Duke Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 74 (September 2005)).
22. See, e.g., Mayor of New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. 662, 736 (1836).
23. On the "family of nations" as an organizing concept in the development of international law,
as a construction of Western oriented global governance, see, MARTI-I KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE
CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 (2001).
24. On the elaboration of the modern system of international law based on the development of a
legal structure through consensus negotiation among the community of states, all of which states together are meant to discipline misbehaving states, see, United Nations, International Law Commission,
Introduction: Origin and Background of the Development and Codification of InternationalLaw, available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/index.htm. With respect to transnational constitutional law principles,
developed in the wake of the defeat of the German and Japanese Empires, the Americans, through an
institutionalized international community, sought to create a new legal order grounded in international
law. The European Union, through its court of justice, has developed a jurisprudence based on a set of
similar notions of mutual support among the EU's Member States grounded in the governance framework of the Community Treaties. See, Commission v. Luxembourg and Belgium (Milk products) Case
90, 91/63, [1964] ECR 625 ("In fact the Treaty is not limited to creating reciprocal obligations between
the different natural ad legal persons to whom it is applicable, but establishes a new legal order which
governs the powers, fights and obligations of the said persons, as well as the necessary procedures for
taking cognizance of and penalizing any breach of it.") Id.
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provisions of national constitutions. 25 The second includes religion 2 6-understood as self-referencing closed systems 27 of organized, universalist, institutionalized, structures of law, ethics and morals-as binding sources of
constitutional norms, as autonomous and complete legal systems. 2 All major religions have produced rules of civil governance and one now seeks to
provide, more or less successfully, frameworks for constituting states
through constitutional law.2 9
Both systems of trans-border constitutional legitimacy produce complex frameworks of behavior rules (systems of morals and ethics). Each
competes with the other for dominion over the construction of governments. States are meant to choose from amongst these and, having chosen
a system of substantive constitutional values, thereafter internalize those
international constitutional norms within their national legal orders.3" The
heart of this exploration is thus on "constitutionalism" as an aspect of legal
universalism.3 1
Consequently, the emphasis will be on the nexus of constitutionalism,
globalism and religion in the construction and limitations' of constitutions
imposed from outside any single state. The essay suggests the secular and
institutional sources of substantive supra-national (that is transnational)
constitutionalism developed after 1945, and the way in which religion has
sought to ape the forms of secular transnational constitutionalism but in
the service of a different set of supra national substantive values. And specifically I will describe the current great contest for a universal basis of
global institutionalization of theology, morals and ethics within global constitutionalism between secular and religious universalism.
The essay starts with a brief exercise in contextualization, fleshing out
a view of the framework within which elites think about constitutions in
modern global legal orders. I start with a review of traditional constitutionalism, that is, with a review of the relationship between state and constitution at the beginning of the 20th century. I then suggest the ways that
25. See discussion, infra, at Section III.
26. The issue of religion is a complicated one. The issue of religion in the "public sphere" at least
in the United States, is even more complicated. See, Larry CatA Backer, Religion as Object and the
Grammarof Law, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 229 (1998).

27. I deliberately draw from but do not specifically focus, for this purpose, on autopoiesis. See
essays in AUTOPOIETIC LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY (Gunther Teubner ed., 1988). I

am particularly sensitive to, but do not here in detail explore, the notions of constitutional and international law as a set of networks that "integrate parts into a whole." NIKLAs LUHMANN, THE DiFFERENTIATION OF SOCIETY 37 (1982).
1

28. See, HAROLD BERMAN, THE ".TERACHON OF LAw AND RELIGION (1974); Larry CatA
Backer, There Can be Only One: Law, Religion, Grammar and The Organization of Society in the
United States, in LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL READER 425-463 (Stephen M. Feldman, ed., 2000).

29. See discussion, infra at section III.
30. "Constitutionalism is the end product of social, economic, cultural, and political progress; it
can become a tradition only if it forms part of the shared history of a people." H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo,
Constitutions Without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an African PoliticalParadox,in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 65, 80 (Greenberg, et al., eds.,

1993).
31. See Oliver Gerstenberg, What InternationalLaw Should (Not) Become. A Comment On Koskenniemi, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 125 (2005).
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consensus on the character of constitutions changed after the Second
World War. That period marked the institutionalization of a universalist
approach to constitutionalism-the idea that all constitutions ought to conform to a specific framework, one with a certain tolerance for national idiosyncrasies, but demanding a conformity to certain fundamental notions of
32
appropriate relationships between state apparatus and citizen.
The section of this essay that follows examines the rise of an alternative universalist transnational constitutionalism-theocratic constitutionalism-to challenge the orthodoxy of the secular post-WWII supraconstitutionalist project. It starts with a look at the big bang of modern
universalist theocratic constitutionalism-the Iranian 1979 constitution and
its progeny, the American inspired constitutions of Afghanistan and Iraq.
The essay fleshes out the great innovation of theocratic constitutionalism,
an innovation that distinguishes this from medieval theocratic models: the
use legality (process constitutionalism) in the service of and to legitimate alternative universal systems of substantive limits to constitutionalchoices.
The essay ends by suggesting morals and consequences.3 3 The rise of
theocratic universalist constitutionalism deepens the relationship between
national constitutions and global norm systems. Sovereignty, at least sovereignty as reflected in the constitution of a state, is no longer the sole province of the people of that nation. At the same time, differences among
constitutional orders have now moved up from the state to the international level. Comparative law ought now to be concerned not solely with
distinctions among states, but also with distinctions among global systems
realized in national legal orders. Constitutional law now has, to an increasing extent, become the object of international rather than national systems.
Lastly, the rise of alternative universalist constitutional systems may have
significant effects on the domestic constitutionalism of the United States.
For those who view theocratic constitutionalism as a positive development
with internal consequences, that development may suggest the means for
interpreting the American constitution in very different ways.
II.

TRADITIONAL ORTHODOXIES OF CONSTITUTIONALISM

At the end of the 20th century, members of the elite global constitutional law academic community could, with confidence, look out on a world
order in which the idea of a single transcendent system of supra-national,
that is of transnational, constitutionalism had emerged as the great norm of
all legitimate national constitutionalism.3 4 This supra-national constitutionalism posited limits on national constitution making grounded in an
32. See, Peter Fitzpatrick, "What Are the Gods to Us Now?": Secular Theology and the Modernity
of Law, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 161-190 (2006).

33. See discussion infra at Section IV, Drawing Morals and Consequences-A First Attempt.
34. For a discussion of the movement toward transnational constitutionalism and its further progression, see, e.g., Gunther Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism:Alternatives to State-Centered Constitutional Theory, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONsTrruTIONALIsM 3-28 (Christian Joerges,

Inger-Johane Sand and Gunther Teubner, eds., 2004).
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evolving set of foundational universal norms derived from the understandings of basic right and wrong developed by consensus among the community of nations.3 5 The focus was on secular universal principles of human
rights.36
These rules of this global system could be enforced by a global bar and
judiciary loyal to this harmonized set of norms. While the effectiveness of
enforcement could be debated, it was clear that no state could unilaterally
opt out of the system, whatever it own views of the relationship between its
internal constitutional system and that of the global legal order. 37 The international community of nations, through its institutional organs, seeks to
build a binding legal framework within which national constitutions are
subordinated to international normative frameworks. The emerging international system of jus cogens, for example, is meant to be applied to even
the most unilateralist constitutional system.38

But the reality of the early 21st century is quite different. The jurisprudential basis of global constitutionalism is in flux, 39 and authority over
norm setting is contested."n The foundations of a universal constitutionalism 4" are both contested and in flux. These contestations and fluctuations
35. "Today, that tradition is most visibly articulated in the debate - especially vocal in Germany about the constitutionalization of international law under the UN Charter." Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 113, 117 (2005). For an
interesting perspective on the law of nations in the United States, and the production of a respect for
international law applicable within and without the U.S., see, Mark Weston Janis, Americans And The
Quest For An Ethical International Law, 109 W. VA. L. REV. 571 (2007).
36. Consider as representative Thomas Buergenthal, Modern Constitutions and Human Rights
Treaties, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211 (1998).
37. An excellent example is provided by the numerous cases constituting the attempts by the
United States of Mexico to force the United States of America to abide by certain treaty provisions
relating to Mexican national accused of crimes in the United States, irrespective of the rules of the
American constitutional order. See Mexico v. U.S., 2004 I.C.J. 1 (March 31); Medellfn v. Dretke, 125
S.Ct. 2088 (2005).
38. See, e.g., Our Global Neighborhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance
48, 60 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) ("As at the national level, so in the global neighborhood, the democratic principle must be ascendant ....
Here, as the role of international institutions in
global governance grows, the need to ensure that they are democratic also increases."). Id. An excellent example was a recent opinion of the OAS Court of Human Rights in an action by the United States
of Mexico against the United States of America with respect to its treatment of undocumented Mexican
nations within the United States. See Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants,
Inter-Am. C.H.R. Advisory Opinion, Report No. 18/03, OEA/Ser.A., doc. 18 (2003).
39. See, e.g., DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER (1995); DAVID HELD,
ANTHONY McGREw, DAVID GOLDBLAIr AND JONATHAN PERRATON, GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS:

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE 450 (1999); Samuel S. Kim, In Search of GlobalConstitutionalism,
in THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD PEACE 55-81 (Richard Falk, Robert Johansen. and
Samuel Kim, eds., 1993).
40. By authority I mean the recognized binding character of understandings and norms flowing
from a certain institutional actor or process. In this case, of one vested in the community of states
acting formally through the organs of the United Nations or other regional supra national organizations, or organically through the elaboration of customary international law of a foundational character.
On one reading of the current difficulty, see Enrique de Rvag6 Bustamante, The Compulsory Character of InternationalLaw, 11 INT'L LEGAL THEORY 69 (2005).
41. By foundations of constitutionalism I mean the normative structure from which the legitimacy of constitutions can be determined in accordance with generally accepted universal standards
embraced by the community of nations. For a discussion of some of these themes, see the essays in
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are a reflection of fundamental and perhaps irreconcilable differences412
smothered under the drive to institutionalize authoritatively late 20th century universalist secular international law-based constitutionalism. Thus, at
the beginning of the 21st century, and just at the moment of its seeming
triumph as THE global standard of constitution-making, at least within important elite communities with authority to speak on these matters,4 3 the
system of secular, political, international norms-bounded constitutionalism-that great political triumph of the Allied Powers after WWII-is being challenged from a variety of different directions.
These contestations and fluctuations pit a number of communities
against each other and against the global universalist constitutionalism
based on "family of nations" consensus on behavior norms. First, national
unilateralist political communities, like the United States and the People's
Republic of China, adhere to traditional normative frameworks rejecting
binding supra-national systems limiting national constitutionalism.44
Second, older and to some extent marginalized universalist constitutional systems seek rehabilitation and authority within the global system.45
Foremost among them are the old Marxist-Leninist universal governance
principles, 46 colonialism and empire, 47 and subordination systems based on
racial, ethnic or other characteristics. 48 Each of these systems seeks to provide a normative basis for the substance of state ordering through constitutions or other mechanisms. But the normative bases of each is substantially
different from that in ascendancy today, forged by the Americans in their
constitutional experiments in Germany and Japan.
CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND LEGITIMACY: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

(Michel

Rosenfeld ed., 1994).
42. Those judgments of irreconcilability are nicely argued in SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE

(1997). But they are also evident in writings from the more or less respectable versions of subaltern position. See, e.g., Madhavi
Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399 (2003); Diane Otto, Subalternity and InternationalLaw:
The Problems of Global Community and the Incommensurability of Difference, 5 SOCIAL AND LEGAL
STUDIES 337 (1996). And even works of a more revolutionary nature. See, e.g., FRANTZ FANON, THE
CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF THE WORLD ORDER

WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (Constance Farrington trans., Grove Weidenfeld 1963) (1961).

43.
44.
45.
standing

See, e.g., PIERRE BOURDIEU, LA NOBLESSE D'tTAT (1989).
The theoretical basis of this system are discussed infra at Section II. A.
While important, these systems are not the subject of this essay. For a traditional underof one of these competing systems from the perspective of its opponents, see the essays in

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM (David Footman ed., Southern Illinois University Press, 1960).

46. For a discussion, see, e.g., Larry Cati Backer, Cuban Corporate Governance at the Crossroads: Cuban Marxism, Private Economic Collectives, and Free Market Globalism, 14 J. OF TRANSNAT'L
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 337 (2004).
47. For a discussion from a critical perspective, see, e.g., Tayyab Mahmud, Geography And International Law: Towards A PostcolonialMapping, 5 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 525 (2007).

48. As one commentator has noted: "The extreme racism, the failure of the Rule of Law to take
root within Japan itself, the sheer weight of numbers of nefarious adventurers, Japan's own slide into a
brutally repressive regime, the lack of a strong humanitarian movement, and the fact that the Japanese
Empire was acquired and controlled against a background of almost non-stop war all combined to
make Japanese imperialism a synonym for repression." DONALD CALMAN, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS

1873 211 (1992). For a
taste of this form of universalism from a Western perspective, see OSWALD SPENGLER, THE HOUR OF
DECISION (1942). Racial imperialism is not confined to European powers. The Japanese expansion was
based in part on notions of racial/cultural superiority.
OF JAPANESE IMPERIALISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF THE GREAT CRISIS OF
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Third, sub-national communities continue to reject universalism on the
basis of declared sub-national exceptionalism claims (going to the uniqueness of their communities). 49 Alternatively, these sub-national communities base their claims on the idea that they are part of larger transnational
communities including ideological, racial & ethnic, and religious communities with their own universalist claims.
Fourth, this confrontation and challenge comes not only from outside,
but is generated from within as well. Successful experiments abroad may
be attempted domestically. This may be part of a system of translation of
norms or of adoption of similar normative frameworks. Thus, as suggested
in the last section of this article,5" the implications for American constitutional law as internally constructed (by its polity and its Supreme Court)
may be great as well, as domestic elites seek to reconstruct American constitutional law on universalist theocratic foundations. Indeed, most important are the challenges by transcendent, universalist, autonomous, religious
communities and their efforts to displace secular universalist normative
frameworks with transcendent religious frameworks no less universal.
In a sense, with these challenges the great universalist constitutional
projects of Anglo-European society come full circle. Having spent the
greater part of the last four centuries unmaking quasi-governmental systems of religious law, the West is now confronted with globalizing political
systems grounded in religion as fully formed politico-legal systems. This
section starts with a brief description of the constitutionalist framework
prior to the Second World War. That framework is characterized by the
triumph of the national state as the supreme repository of law making
power. This system focused on legality (process) not substance, except to
the extent it reflects the will of the sovereign.
This section then examines the movement from a national supremacist
constitutionalism model to the present system of global constitutionalism.
Global constitutionalism describes the great post-WWII Western project of
contextualizing constitution making within limits derived from international law, norms or standards. It represents a shift in focus from process
to substance and legality, especially around the limitations of government
power against individuals. It also represents a shift of authority over substance from the constituting state to the international community of nations. The object is both the creation of a universal normative framework
for constitutional values and a harmonization of constitutions pursuant to
great principles of democracy and human rights; evolution of this hierarchy
of a 'higher' higher law of the constitution.

49. See, e.g., Larry CatAi Backer, Forging FederalSystems Within a Matrix of Contained Conflict:
The Example of the European Union, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1331 (1998).
50. See section IV, Drawing Morals and Consequences-A First Attempt, infra.
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TraditionalConstitutionalismBefore WWII: Constitutionalismin 1900

A.

The bedrock presumption of traditional late post-Westphalian constitutionalism was that nation-states stood at the apex of global legal orders. 5 '
The foundation of state power was popular will (however manifested).
That manifestation could arise from a number of sources: (1) the people;5 2
(2) their representatives;5 3 (3) the monarch; 54 (4) or a dictatorship of the
proletariat.
As the unique expression of a unique national will, governments and
its constitutions were not constrained by law. Two types of limitation on
constituted government were suggested, one focusing on the realities of
power and the other on the limitations of self-interest within moral and
cultural constraints. Thus, for example, it was thought that "[t]he external
limit to the real power of a sovereign consists in the possibility or certainty
that his subjects, or a large number of them, will disobey or resist his
laws."5 6 An older English tradition, leading to the decapitation of an English monarch, suggested the limits as an abuse by the sovereign of authority under law.5 7 On the other hand:
51.

See, e.g., WEsTEL W. WILLOUGHBY, THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC LAW 307-309

(1924).
52. Eighteenth century constitutions from the United States and France, so called first generation constitutions, stressed popular sovereignty and the constitutive act of will of the people in establishing a legitimate apparatus of state. The tradition of popular sovereignty, and the legitimating power
of the collective to constitute an apparatus for the state, has become a foundation for legitimate assertions of constitutive power. On the theoretics of popular sovereignty from a then contemporary perspective, see THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay) (1789).
53. Thus, for example, the Weimar Constitution and the constitutions of several central European states vested national legislatures with the constitutive power of the people, to be exercised as
legislation or constitutional law making at their option. The road from Weimar to National Socialist
dictatorship has served as a cautionary tale for this form of governance since 1945. On the Weimar
constitution, see Arthur T. Von Mehren, Constitutionalismin Germany-The First Decision of the New
ConstitutionalCourt, 1 AM. J. COMP. L. 70 (1952) (explaining as a weakness of Weimar constitutionalism the absence of strong judicial review mechanisms of basic rights, which were "further weakened by
constitutional provisions making them subject to exception by ordinary legislation ... and noting further a power in the executive to set aside fundamental rights in an emergency.") Id. at 73. The representatives of the people need not be elected. The German Imperial Constitution was grounded in an
alliance entered into among various rulers of what would become parts of the German Empire, the
President of the resulting Confederation was to be the King of Prussia holding the title German Emperor. See German Imperial Constitution (Verfassung der Deutches Reiches (1871)) at tit. IV, art. 11.
54. Non-democratic constitutions are characterized by grants of constitutive authority from the
power holder. In the case of the German and Japanese Imperial constitutions, that grant came from the
imperial household or the person of the Emperor/Empress. For a discussion, see Y. Yamada, Note:
The New JapaneseConstitution, 4 INT'L & COMP. L.Q 197 (1955) ("Sovereignty resides with the nation
nowadays, whereas in the past it resided with the Emperor himself.") Id. at 199.
55. The Constitutionalism of the Chinese Communist Party stresses this form of democratic centralism. Larry CatA Backer, The Rule of Law, The Chinese Communist Party, and Ideological Campaigns: Sange Daibiao (the "Three Represents"), Socialist Rule of Law, and Modern Chinese
Constitutionalism,16 J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29 (2006).
56. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 30 (8th ed.
1915).
57. See Larry CatAi Backer, Reifying Law: Understanding Law Beyond the State, 25 PENN ST.
1NT'L L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
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The internal limit to the exercise of sovereignty arises from
the nature of the sovereign power itself. Even a despot exercises his powers in accordance with his character, which is
itself molded by the circumstances under which he lives, including under that head the moral feelings of the time and
the society to which he belongs.58
As a consequence, the foundational issue of constitutional orders was
authenticity of that expression of the national will by whatever means institutionalized. Legitimacy was the foundation of constitutional orders. Constitutions constituted government. 59 Law constituted the relations among
the people outside the state apparatus, 60 and higher law constituted the
relations between the people and the state. 6 1 Law and government were
not necessarily identical.62
Traditionally, state-centered constitutionalism concentrates on issues
of fraud and illegitimacy. Lawful use of authority is the key element of
legitimacy. Constitutional techniques are deployed to police against arbitrariness or the use of arbitrary state power. These techniques formed the
core of traditional Rechtsstaat.63 Yet the substance of legality is less important than its authenticity as an expression of the polity through legitimate
channels for the expression of power. Thus Rechtsstaat notions find expression in both democratic and totalitarian societies-for the Americans with
the rise of process theory,64 with the NAZI regime with the theoretics of
Carl Schmitt in 1930s Germany, 65 and with the construction of a Japanese
militarist despotism.66
58.

DICEY, supra note 56, at 32.

59. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (1789) ("It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example,
to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing
good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their
political constitutions on accident and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we
are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made.") Id.
60. See, e.g., PAOLO GROSSI, MITOLOGIAS JURIDICAS DA MODERNIDADE (2004).

61.

EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW (1955).

62. For a discussion of the theory, see Larry Catd Backer Symposium: Law and the State in the
Transnational Legal Order: Reifying Law: UnderstandingLaw Beyond the State, 25 PENN ST. INT'L L.
REV. - (forthcoming 2007).

63. "The Rechtsstaat principle contemplates government according to law and allows a remedy to
be obtained in an impartial administrative court for governmental violations of the law. However, the
right to obtain such relief must be granted by the legislature, either in the form of a general grant or by
specifically enumerating the types of violation for which a remedy may be obtained." Nobushige Ukai,
The Individual and the Rule of Law Under the New Japanese Constitution, 51 Nw. U. L. REV. 733, 735736 (1956).
64. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
65. CARL SCHMITr, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY (Jeffrey Seitzer trans., Duke University Press

2004) (1958).
66. See Sakae Wagatsuma, Guarantee of FundamentalHuman Rights Under the Japanese Constitution, 26 WASH. L. REV. 145, 154 (1951) ("Under the new Constitution, therefore, there is no longer
the likelihood, as there was under the old Constitution of the fundamental freedoms and equalities
being unreasonably restricted by law, however much the political trend of the National Diet may
change.") Id.
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Thus the key to traditional constitutionalism is a distinction between

substance and process. While legitimacy requires protection, substantive
values are inherently political and constituted outside the framework of a

national constitution. The expression of substantive values or judgments,
no matter how vile by the standards of others, would have to be lawful as
long as it was the product of lawfully derived rules. Substantive expression
is essentially extra-constitutional. The stakeholders, who constituted the

state for whose behalf the apparatus of state functions, are the only persons
who could limit that expression. Any such substantive limitation could be
drawn in the constitution itself, or otherwise through lawful action by the
polity in accordance with the process guarantees of the constitution. But it
can also be limited to those standards not accepted by the popular will and

written (or otherwise provided) in the Constitutional framework of any
particular state. Principles of international law might guide the behavior of

states among themselves, and the behavior norms might provide a touchstone for judging the validity of the expression of domestic political will
(and the place of a state within the community of nations as civilized or
not),6 7 but it could not override that expression of will as memorialized in a
constitution.6 8

It was a sense of dissatisfaction with the limits of this sort of constitutionalism that led to an attempt to re-conceive constitutionalism after 1945.
If the Germans could create a rule of law legitimizing extraordinary cruelty

and destruction, made authoritative and institutionalized in a most professional manner through their state apparatus, if the Japanese could use their
constitutional structure as a vehicle for barbarous militarism, then constitutionalism itself would have to be reworked. And that was a task that the
Allied victors in general, and especially the Americans as heirs to a vision-

ary constitutionalism of their own, thought was fundamental to preventing

future warmongering among the defeated states they occupied,6 9 or the
wholesale stripping of rights through constitutionally lawful methods.7" It
is to that project that great minds, and global elites, threw themselves after

1945.
67. See WILLOUGHBY, supra note 51, at 29-39.

68. Thus, at the time of the reconstitution of the Japanese constitution within the framework of
transnational constitutionalism, the war renunciation cause appeared remarkable-in accordance with
traditional approaches to constitutionalism. "One of the strangest arguments advanced at that time was
that the nation would find security within the United Nations with the Security Council taking over
Japan's defense and perhaps permitting Japan appropriate measures of self defense. A strange argument indeed-look to an external force for permission to do that which is within the power of a sovereign nation!" P. Allen Dionisopoulos, The No War Clause in the Japanese Constitution, 31 IND. L. J. 437,
440 (1956). Cf, The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66 (1825); The Amistad, 40 U.S. 518 (1841).
69. Thus, for example, with reference to the Japanese constitutional renunciation of war, General
Douglas MacArthur wrote "The renunciation of war is a unique feature of the new Constitution. Born
out of the bitter experience of war and defeat, this provision bears the impress of the modern conception that mankind constitutes a unity." Douglas MacArthur, Report 1945, quoted in Dionisopoulos,
supra note 68, at 441. See, e.g., Harold S. Quigley, Japan's Constitutions: 1890 and 1947, 41 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 864 (1947) (on the Japanese post-War constitutional provisions renouncing war).
70. See, e.g., Robert G. Neumann, New Constitution in Germany, 42 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 448
(1948) (value of new Basic Law in fostering democracy in post war Germany).
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Though the paper uses 1945 as its starting point, the date is clearly
arbitrary, though suitable for the purposes of the arguments made here.
Still, it is worth noting certain important caveats. First, for some the exercise is a reminder, sometimes uncomfortable, of a longer-term effort of
Western states to extend and secure their dominance of global politics and
political culture. From that perspective, the arguments made here might be
suspect as a foundational matter. Transnational constitutionalism merely
emphasizes the character of the exercise as a product of Western States
seeking to universalize their ideas of constitutionalism in terms of: (i) arbitrary use of power (process aspects-rule of law), and (ii) substantive limits
of power (substantive rule of law: human rights).7" This may make constitutionalism of limited value in the developed world where assimilation and
uniformity may work against or exclude a certain necessary diversity.72 For
others, the origins and history of this project in transnational constitutionalism might make less difference than content and value of the ideas they
project. Second, 1945 is an arbitrary cut off or starting date. The roots go
back over a century in different countries in different historical, political,
cultural and social contexts. We may remember that "Napoleon I, another
military occupant, was a great reformer and succeeded in having European
countries he conquered adopt ideas and institutions resulting from the
French Revolution."7 3 Latin America saw efforts to secularize national
constitutions in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Africa saw British
efforts, usually misplaced and meant to harmonize in accordance with British notions of universal approaches to governance, the constitutionalization
and rationalization of indigenous codes. Even the Westphalian system contains the seeds of constitutional law universalism, though that was not a
road taken after the 17th century in Europe for the most part.
But the focus is on events after 1945 for several reasons. First, the
period after 1945 saw, for the first time, conscious efforts by a global community to systematize and institutionalize a system of behavior norms limiting constitutional expression of any given polity. Second, this period also
witnesses the first attempts to place that systemization/institutionalization
within a vertical hierarchy of 'higher law' in which the constitutions of
states did not come out on top. Third, the norms themselves for the first
time acquire a more developed autonomy and independence from the control of any state or groups of states (however that control was usually expressed internally. Fourth, this period also witnessed for the first time an
71. See M. Koskenniemi, Legal Universalism: Between Moralityand Power in a World of States, in
JUSTICE, AND POWER, BETWEEN REASON AND WILL 46 (S.Chen ed., 2004). But see Wagatsuma,
supra note 66 ("The recent war was begun, it may be said, in utter disregard of the real will of the
people .... At least we may safely say the positive guarantee of fundamental human rights is the
minimum requirement for the regeneration of Japan as a peace loving, cultural nation free form the
tendency to wage an aggressive war once more."). Id. at 145.
LAW,

72. See

JAMES TULLY, STRANGE MULPLICITY-CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF DIVERSITY

58 (1995).
73. Alfred C. Oppler, The Reform of Japan'sLegal andJudicialSystem Under Allied Occupation,
24 WASH. L. REV. 290 (1949).
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attempt to draw a conscious link between state constitutions and independent (international) norms.
B.

Building Universalist ConstitutionalismAfter the Second World War

The end of the Second World War suggested to American elites the
opportunity to effect large changes in governance systems.74 The focus of
a
the Allied Powers after the end of the war was on the construction of 75
system of states that would make war less likely or at least more costly.
They wished to institutionalize these protections through the U.N. system
as well as through a variety of supra-national multi-state arrangements.76
The goal of the Allied Powers was to tie all states together in a community
of nations in which would be placed the power to set the limits of state
constitutionalism. The 77institutional focus of that embrace was to be the
United Nations system.
For nation-states, that embrace of a framework of constitutionalism
based on the power of a community of states to set the limits of state constitutionalism required a reorientation of constitutionalism away from a
single minded focus on process to one that would provide a greater concentration on the legitimacy of the substantive content of constitutions There
were two major objectives of this new universalist transnational constitutionalism. First, constitutionalism was to be made into a force for limiting
recourse the resort even to otherwise lawful power. Power over the constitution of the state was to be shared between the people of a nation-state,
and the people of the community of states. Constitutions were to become a
means for limiting the range of expression of popular will, especially with
respect to its spillover effects on individuals (for example slavery or the
extermination of minorities) or other states (militarism). Those limitations
were now to be placed in the hands of the international community rather
than left in those of the political community of any single nation-state.
Second, constitutionalism was to focus on harmonizing those universal
substantive restraints so that all states within the community of nations
would act alike, or adhere to the same set of codes of behavior. Effectively, the architects of the new universalist constitutionalism sought to democratize and institutionalize the "civilized nations" framework of 19th
century international law 78 within the bounds of national constitutionalism.
74. "The world is today witnessing another important stage in constitutional history. In Europe,
Asia and South America, adjustments to a new order have necessitated basic changes in fundamental
law." Harrop A. Freeman, New Constitutions of Europe,Asia, and South America, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 1
(1948).
75. See Dionisopoulos, supra note 68 ("The victorious powers wanted to mold Japan into a democracy by imposing Western democratic institutions on the Japanese and to create a 'peace loving'
nation by destroying all vestiges of the war machine.") Id. at 441.
76. "If the objectives of the Potsdam Declaration were to be achieved, the victorious powers had
to be willing to police the defeated nation; the policing power depended on domestic politics and international relations." Id. at 438.
77. Cf MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 (2001).
78. See description in

WILLOUGHBY,

supra note 51, at 307-309.
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And the focus of that effort was to be on human rights.7 9 In 80this effort, the
Allies were to be wildly, though not uncritically, successful.

The great initial models of this new universalist constitutionalism were
the German81 and Japanese 82 post-war constitutions. These constitutions

were the product of Allied thinking.8 3 And the American academic elite
was an eager participant as well,8 4 a role they sought to reprise after the fall

of "communism" in Eastern Europe.85 (need to put aside racial/ethnic
overlay, especially with respect to the construction of the Japanese Constitution). But they were also meant to apply the experience of American
constitutionalism in a new form to sole governance problems very different
from that confronting the founders in 1789. As a consequence, the result-

ing constitutions were to be quite different in scope and character.8 6
The Allied powers, and especially the United States and its legal estab-

lishment, were a powerful influence in what was seen as part of a larger
global project. American perspectives in the formation of international

constitutionalism began its first full flowering with the projects to reconstitute Japanese and German legal political institutions along a more structurally limited (that is constitutionally bounded) way.8 7 The reconstitution of
79. For a discussion on the effect of this perspective in the construction of the Japanese post War
constitution, see Sakae Wagatsuma, Guarantee of Fundamental Human Rights Under the Japanese Constitution, 26 WASH. L. REV. 145 (1951); Y. Yamada, The New Japanese Constitution, 4 Itrr'L & COMP. L.
Q. 197, 200 (1955) ("In light of past history, the present constitution recognizes what it calls fundamental human rights and declares that they shall be conferred upon the people of this and future generations as eternal and inviolate rights."). For its importance in the construction of the German Bund after
1945, see Charles J. Friedrich, Rebuilding the German Constitution 11, 43 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 704, 707708 (1949).
80. For a criticism from a contemporary African constitutional development perspective, see
Ruth Gordon, Growing Constitutions, 1 J. CONST. L. 528 (1999).
81. Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz) (1949), available at http://
www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.html.
82. The Constitution of Japan (1946), available at http://web-japan.org/factsheet/const/
index.html.
83. See, e.g., Harold S. Quigley, Japan'sConstitutions: 1890 and 1947, 41 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 864
(1947) (Japanese post-War Constitutional provisions were product of Occidental thinking though it
might reflect values inherent in Japanese culture); P. Allen Dionisopoulos, The No War Clause in the
Japanese Constitution, 31 IND. L. J. 437, 441 (1956) ("external supervision (the Occupation Forces) was
necessary to guarantee acceptance of Japanese democratic organization and renunciation of war"). Id.
On the Allied efforts to forge a German "constitution" in the 1940s, see Charles J. Friedrich, Rebuilding
the German Constitution 1, 43 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 461, 469-471, 476-480 (1949).
84. All sectors of American political life participated in the enterprise. For the view from the
Socialist camp. See, e.g., Saffell, John, Japan's Post-WarSocialist Party, 42 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 5 (1948).
85. Jacques deLisle, Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance, American Legal Models,
And Legal Change In The Post-Communist World And Beyond, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 179, 179180 (1999) ("Asked to provide advice to a Central or Eastern European nation drafting its first post
socialist constitution, a prominent American legal academic promptly produces an elaborate manuscript headed 'Constitution of the Republic of
.' The document is a form-book charter of
economic liberties, liberal rights, democratic governance, and limited governmental powers that awaits
only a few strokes of the pen to insert the recipient country's name."). Id.
86. "Even in those countries where Americans have had a sizeable hand in formulating the documents, the constitutions are more leftist and advanced than the parent model." Harrop A. Freeman,
New Constitutions of Europe, Asia, and South America, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 28 (1948).
87. Id. at 5 ("The new constitutions of Japan and Bavaria, Hesse and Wuertenberg-Baden in the
American zone in Germany are of particular interest because they may represent present American
constitutional thinking.").
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Japan and Germany also would set the stage for later constitutional interventions of two types. The first would include American interventionism in
the reconstitution of post Soviet states in the 1990s. 88 The second would
involve the naturalization of post War constitutionalist discourse in the reconstitution of post-colonial states, from Argentina in the 1980s89 to South
Africa and other Sub Saharan states in the 1990s, 9° to Islamic fundamentalist states at the beginning of the 21st century. 91
The thrust of post War constitutionalism, as applied to Germany and
Japan, was meant to create substantive limits on the exercise of the political
will of the German and Japanese people by imposing strict structural limits
on the availability of state power to affect certain ends. There were two
principal objectives. The first was cultural-the Allied Powers meant to
help restructure Japanese and German political culture, stripping the former of its militarism and the later of its disrespect for human life, and deepening in both a respect for democratic values and institutions.9 2 This was
thought to involve a large-scale reconstitution of the Kulturstaatprinciples
of the defeated states. 93 The second was instrumental-to use the formal
mechanics of government creation to impose strict sets of substantive and
procedural limits on the power of the state apparatus either to be used
against its own people or to be used against others.94 Quoting from the
United States Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan, John Maki described
how the Policy for the occupation was directed to the achievement of only
two basic objectives:
88. See Rett R. Ludwikowski, Supreme Law Or Basic Law? The Decline Of The Concept Of
ConstitutionalSupremacy, 9 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 253 (2001).
89. See, e.g., Alejandro M. Garro, Judicial Review Of ConstitutionalityIn Argentina: Background
Notes And ConstitutionalProvisions,45 Duo.L. REV. 409 (2007); Illeana Gomez, Comment, Declaring
Unconstitutional a Constitutional Amendment: The Argentine Judiciary Forges Ahead, 31 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 93, 95-101 (2000).
90. See, e.g., Devika Hovell and George Williams, A Tale of Two Systems: The Use of International Law in Constitutional Interpretation in Australia and South Africa, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 95
(2005).
91. This aspect is taken up infra at text and notes at Section III, "In the name of God, the
Merciful, the Compassionate: The Rise of Theocratic Constitutionalism."
92. See JOHN M. MAKI, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN JAPAN: THE ROAD TO DEMOCRACY 4360 (1962).
93. "The occupation of Japan ... is developing along quite unusual lines. Above and beyond
those military considerations which normally govern the dispositions victors make of enemy territory,
there are present in the Allied control of Japan broad programs for social, political and economic
reform, some phases of which are only faintly related to the elimination of militarism or the reduction
of military potential." Thomas J. Blakemore, Post-War Developments in Japanese Law, 1947 Wis. L.
REV. 632 (1947).

94. Thus, in discussing the early jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court, Arthur von Mehren noted the importance of a judicial construction of the German Basic Law from which
it extracted to fundamental principles with overriding effect-"the principles of democracy and federalism." Arthur T. von Mehren, Constitutionalism in Germany-The First Decision of the New Constitutional Court, 1 AM. J. COMp. L. 70, 86 (1952). With respect to the Japanese Constitution, the only other
and by far more constructive alternative was to replace the old charter by a new fundamental law,
which was to establish the guiding principles or the over-all program on which a democratic system of
government could be built and from which modern legislation could be developed. Alfred C. Oppler,
The Reform ofJapan's Legal and Judicial System Under Allied Occupation, 24 WASH. L. REV. 290, 297
(1949).
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"(a) To ensure that Japan will not again become a menace
to the United States or to the peace and security of the
world. (b) To bring about the eventual establishment of a
peaceful and responsible government which will respect the
rights of other states and will support the objectives of the
and principles of
United States as reflected in the3 ideals
95
the Charter of the United Nations.
For Germany, on the other hand, constitutionalism was to be built from the
bottom up, in an effort to reverse the centralization of power that had
marked German national development since 1871.96 Echoing what would
later form part of the basis underlying the creation of the European Coal
and Steel Community (and eventually the European Union), the 1945 directive (amended in 1947) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Germany declared that the Allies had no intention of imposing its own form of
government on Germany. But it sought the establishment of a constitutionalist state in Germany grounded on basic principles of mandatory constitutional ordering to which Germany, like other sates, must be subject.
It seeks the establishment in Germany of a political organization which is derived from the people and subject to their
control, which operates in accordance with democratic electoral procedures, and which is dedicated to uphold both the
basic civil and human rights of the individual. It is opposed
to an excessively centralized government which through a
concentration of power may threaten both the existence of
democracy in Germany and the security of Germany's
neighbors and the rest of the world. 97
Constitutionalism was thus born out of a desire to strip sovereign polities of their discretion in exercising sovereign power by positing-as a
newly constituted set of doctrines of constitutionalism-a set of substantive
and process values which no state could contravene in its self constitution
or in the implementation or exercise of its constitutional order. 98 Constitutionalism was to become an exercise in transnationalism, in which all states
95. JOHN M. MAKI, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN JAPAN: THE ROAD TO DEMOCRACY 44
(1962).
96. See Charles J. Friedrich, Rebuilding the German Constitution 1, 43 Am. POL. ScI. REV. 461,
465-469 (1949).
97. Directive Regarding the Military Government of Germany, July 11, 1947, Dept. of State Pub.
2913, quoted in Charles J. Friedrich, Rebuilding the German Constitution I, 43 Am. POL. Scl. REV. 461,
466 (1949).
98. See supra, note 8 for the German conception of the limiting power of Sozialstaat ideals on
Rechtsstaat constitutionalism. Sakae Wagatsuma noted, for an American academic audience, that with
respect to the new fundamental rights guaranteed under the Japanese postwar constitution, what "is of
utmost importance, however, is that these rights of freedom under the new Constitution are not guaranteed as the 'rights which cannot be restricted except in accordance with law' but as the 'rights which are
inviolable even in accordance with law."' Sakae Wagatsuma, Guarantee of FundamentalRights Under
the Japanese Constitution, 26 WASH. L. REV. 145, 154 (1951) ("One may easily perceive that in this
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were to have responsibilities to the community of nations in their internal
constitution. And this was done for the best of all reasons-to avoid a repetition of the excesses of the Second World War, as calculated by the Allied
Powers.
The makers of the German and Japanese post War constitutions drew
generally from three sources of substantive (moral/ethical) nominative limits on constitutionally legitimate state power:99 The first was to be found in
the communal traditions of the state itself (expression of their highest communal aspirational views of themselves: as civilized, advanced, democratic,

and the like).1"' The second was to be found in the aggregate of the moral/
ethical behavior rules which find expression in the legal orders of all
civilized states. 1 And the third was to be found in the formal legal

provision [art. 97 of the new Constitution] the ideology which regards fundamental rights not as the
rights merely guaranteed by state laws but as natural rights inherent in mankind manifests itself
clearly"). Id.
99. See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, The Originsof Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation
in Postwar Europe, 54 INT'L ORG. 217 (2000).
100. Post War writers in the West emphasized the constitutional and social traditions of Japan and
Germany lending themselves to a democratic social and political order. Thus, for example, Kurt Steiner,
the Chief, Civil Affairs and Civil Liberties Branch, Legislation and Judicial Division, Legal Section,
GHQ, SCAP, Tokyo, Japan, wrote in 1950 of the revolutionary character of the Japanese attitudes to
family (and thus also to social) organization. He concluded that "the reform of the Civil Code was in
line with tendencies active in Japanese society for some decades." Kurt Steiner, Postwar Changes in the
Japanese Civil Code, 25 WASH. L. REV. 286, 312 (1950) ("while it has been pointed out that legislative
changes alone do not bring about new social conditions, there is no doubt that reform, in doing away
with all legal sanctions against non conformity, will considerably hasten the adjustment of the farers
and fishermen to the freer urban concept."). Id. at 312. Harold Quigley noted, again with respect to
Japan, that the "new constitution embodies in law a political fact many centuries old. The Emperor is
authorized to perform certain 'acts of state,' but is specifically forbidden to exercise 'powers related to
government."' Harold S. Quigley, Japan'sConstitutions:1890 and 1947, 41 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 865, 869
(1947) ("The new constitution is, however, a projection of lines of development that were apparent
before the Manchurian crisis occurred. That fact is an augury of its survival."). Id. at 874.
101. Thus, Thomas Blakemore noted at the time that "in its definition of governmental institutions and their powers, this Constitution is clear and incorporates the experience of many nations."
Thomas L. Blakemore, Postwar Developments in Japanese Law, 1947 Wis. L. REV. 632, 640. Charles
Friedrich described German constitutionalism as "partly German, partly French, partly English, and
partly American." Charles J. Friedrich, Rebuilding the German Constitution I, 43 AM. PoL. Sci. REV.
461, 462 (1949). The roots of these ideas can be found in the earliest notions of 20th century international law, which posited a set of behavior codes grounded in agreement by the Great Powers. The
mechanism of supra national behavior control rested on agreement among the Great Powers and was
enforced by the ability of these Powers to act militarily against states that disregarded the rules. See
Pollock, The Sources of InternationalLaw, 2 CoLUM. L. REV. 511, 512 (1902). This suggested an attempt to impose on Constitutional law the rules of the international community as reflecting behavior
(substantive law) ideals that could not be avoided in the construction of domestic systems. These notions were bound up in early formulations of international law that conflated supra-national characteristics with internal legal substantive sensibilities. "The principles of international law are the principles
which are in force between all independent nations." The S.S. Lotus, Permanent Court of International
Justice Ser. A No. 10 (1927). I note, but will not address here, the argument, grounded in post colonial
theory and discourse, that the substance of these standards attempt to universalize Western notions of
governance and institutional morallethical behavior and that this (alone or in conjunction with other
factors) makes them suspect or less valuable. See e.g., EDWARD SAID, ORIErrALISM (1978). Yet, even
that position is itself highly contestable.
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instruments among the 1community
states. 02

behavior among

The Preamble to the Post War Japanese Constitution sets these themes

out nicely:
"We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are
deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human rela-

tionship, and we have determined to preserve our security
and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peaceloving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an

honored place in an international society striving for the
preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and
slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the
earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the
right to live in peace, free from fear and want.
We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, but
that laws of political morality are universal; and that obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all nations who would

sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship with other nations."1

3

Yet, even a couple of generations out, the Japanese still feel the foreignness
of the imposition of this system, which they are still attempting to claim as
their own. 10 4
The German constitution is also self consciously aware of its role as
both the foundation of a "rule of law" state and of the expression of the
normative content of that "rule of law" governance system in unalterable
principles of a "social state." The Grundgesetz focuses on restraining government in its power over individuals and minority or subordinated -that
102. This element was recognized in the development of the German Basic Law. See Arthur
Lenhof, The German (Bonn) Constitution With Comparative Glances at the Frenchand Italian Constitutions, 24 TUL. L. REv.1, 34-35 (1949) (explaining how the German, French and Italian constitutions
express "the subordination of the nation under a higher authority, a "more perfect" organization, a
control by international law and order, binding upon the individual nations.") Id. at 34. The pre War
foundations of this last strand of transnational constitutionalism was recognized as derived from the
constitutional traditions of both Anglo-American and German republican constitutionalism. See Lawrence Preuss, Editorial Comment: InternationalLaw in the Constitution of the Lander in the American
Zone in Germany, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 888 (1947). He noted the long tradition of rules of the family of
civilized states as binding the community of nations belong to that "family." He explained that judicial
practice "assumed, as did Lord Alverstone in the West Rand case, that whatever had received the common consent of civilized countries must have received the consent of their own, and that it could hardly
be supposed that a Kulturstaat would repudiate a rule widely and generally accepted by others. Thus the
obligatory character of international law was reconciled with the logical exigencies of positivist theory."
Id. at 893 (citing West Rand Gold Mining, Ltd. v. The King, 2 K.B. 391, 406-407 (1905).
103. Japan Const, available at http://web-japan.org/factsheet/const/pre.html. At the time of its creation Harold Quigley noted that "Whereas the constitutions of Prussia and other German states of the
early 1880s were the models used by Meiji statesmen, American, British, and internationalist principles
are dominant in the present constitution." Harold S.Quigley, Japan's Constitutions: 1890 and 1947, 41
AM. POL. Sci. REv. 865, 867 (1947).
104. See Masaru Tamamoto, Reflections on Japan's Postwar State, 124 DAEDALUS 1 (1994).
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power the monopoly of power over individuals begins to shift from nation-

states to the community of nations. Consider Article 1 of the Grundgesetz:
"(1) Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority. (2) The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and
inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of
peace and of justice in the world. (3) The following basic
rights shall bind the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary as directly applicable law."' 5

The supra constitutional character of these provisions is confirmed within
the text of the Grundgesetz itself, which forbids constitutional modification
of the principles of basic rights, and the democratic and federal character of

the state, except perhaps by an act rejecting the Basic Law in its entirety
and substituting for it another.1"6 These notions were most recently explored and confirmed in the German Maastricht case.'

7

The German Fed-

eral Constitutional Court clearly articulated the nature, scope and
limitations of political constitution, and the nature of their relationship to
generalized principles of universalized human standards of conduct. That

action by the court itself evidenced an embrace of Sozialstaat (substantive
principles8 based) limits on otherwise legally sufficient bases of government
10

action.
In both cases, the Japanese and German constitutions were meant to
exceed that of their predecessors, and perhaps even solve problems that
continued to plague the constitutional systems of the Allied powers. The
emphasis on human rights in the black letter of German and Japanese constitutions, was grounded on the sense that while these were unnecessary in
the constitutional traditions of the United States and the U.K., because
they were culturally deeply engrained in these political and social systems,
the same was not true of less well culturally developed states-like Germany and Japan.10 9 With some hindsight irony, some of these provisions
105. GRUNDGESETrZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 1 (F.R.G.).
106. See GG art. 79. At the time of its enactment it was viewed by American academics as a bit of
a constitutional oddity, and one not worth spending much time on. See, e.g., Charles J. Friedrich, Rebuilding the German Constitution 11, 43 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 704, 719 (1949).
107. See Brunner v. European Union Treaty (German Maastricht case) 89 BVerfGE 155; 20
EuGRZ 429; [1993] NJW 3047; English translation available at: 1 CMLR 57; (1994) 33 ILM 388. The
irony of that case, of course, was its emphasis on the lack of legitimacy of supra national institutions (in
this case those of the European Union) with respect to the universal values of state organization.
108. "For generations, German jurists accepted whatever law was made by the lawmaker. Its
interpretation became a mere 'art' or 'technique.' The men exercising it were supporting what was
nothing but a dubious legality, until under the Hitler regime that legality was finally found to be fraudulent." Gottfried Dietze, UnconstitutionalConstitutional Norms? ConstitutionalDevelopment in Postwar Germany, 42 VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1956).
109. Consider in this respect Thomas Blakemore's understanding of the development of civil liberties in Japan. Thomas L. Blakemore, PostwarDevelopments in Japanese Law, 1947 Wis. L. REV. 632,
649-52. Quoting from Hozumi Nobushige's work on the Japanese Civil Code, the understanding at the
time was that:
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were viewed as silly because they sought to elevate hortatory provisions to

law in a way uncharacteristic of Anglo-American constitutionalism.
The American observer, used to the classic draftsmanship of

his own constitution, may be repelled by the verbosity and
pamphleteering character of some of the German provisions.... A country like England, where the tradition of
personal freedom is deeply engrained, may easily do without a single document embodying the supreme law of the

land. But where liberty is not so secure, a strong constitution can give added strength to the friends of democracy

and help confound its enemies. 110

One of the most interesting aspects of this mentality is the academic loathing of political parties. The expectation, apparently, in the 1940s was that
Japanese political parties might be of a better character than those of their

American or European
counterparts."1
1 12
to the same criticism.

The German efforts were subject

Within a generation of their introduction, the principles underlying
Japanese and German constitution making became systematized and generalized within the field of transnational constitutionalism. And increasingly, from the 1970s on, came to be centered outside the nation state and
within a progressively more completely developed set of transnational and
international institutions. Thus constitutional normative common law began to be expressed, for example, through positivist rules of global institutions-the U.N. in particular, as the great source of the communal civilizer
The notion of right did not originally exist in Japan before the introduction of Western Jurisprudence. Many Western writers assume that right is coeval with law, and law and right are
only two terms expressing the same notion from different points of view. Some even go so far
as to affirm that right is anterior to law, and that letter only exists for the assurance or protection of the former. In Japan, however, the idea of right did not exist so long as her laws
belonged to the Chinese Family. There was indeed the notion of duty or obligation buy
neither the notion of right nor the word for it existed in either Japanese or Chinese.
HozuMi NOBUSHIGE, THE NEW JAPANESE CIVIL CODE AS MATERIAL FOR THE STUDY OF COMPARA-

JURISPRUDENCE (1912).
110. See Robert G. Neumann, New Constitutions in Germany, 42 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 448, 467-468
(1948) (viewing these pas the black-letter expression of political party propaganda) Id. at 449-51, 454456. He sarcastically suggesting that perhaps "the framers built themselves a prison of Weltanschauung
from which they could no longer escape." Id. at 451. But of course, that is precisely what they did.
111. "Can the cesspools of corruption called political parties be cleaned up and forced to serve the
national interest in preference to the narrow interests f the individual bosses?" Justin Williams, The
Japanese Diet Under the New Constitution, 42 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 927, 939 (1948). The question might
well have been asked of those of their American masters at the time. The weakness of the political
party organization in Japan in the immediate postwar period is discussed in John Saffell, Japan's Postwar Socialist Party, 42 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 957-69 (1948); Harry Emerson Wddes, UndergroundPolitics
in Post-War Japan, 42 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1149-1162 (1948) (on the construction of political machines);
Justin Williams, Party Politics in the New Japanese Diet, 42 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 1163-1180 (1948) (on
lobbying).
112. See Robert G. Neumann, New Constitutionsin Germany, 42 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 448, 450-451
(1948).
TIVE
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of states through international law now limiting constitutions.' 1 3 Other en-

tities also began to become great players in this area. The European Court
of Justice had a great impact through the elaboration of systems of general
principles of Community Law derived from out of the constitutional traditions of the Member States of the European Union along with the pronouncements and principles of international law derived form regional
human rights institutions and international organizations." 4 These regional human rights institutions, for example the European Court of
Human Rights," 5 the Inter-American Court' 16 and others, have also developed a set of substantive principles limiting the scope and elaboration of
constitutional governance with effects on the substantive content of national constitutional law provisions."17 Recently the criminal law of human

rights has been internationalized as well through the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court."1 8 The internationalization of substantive
and process rights, available to all individuals, irrespective of the peculiar

nature of the constitutional order of the states in which their citizenship
rights derive, still forms a critical project of so called international law. 1 9
Thus, by the third quarter of the 20th century a pattern of global understanding, the customary practices of a majority of states within their
constitutional orders, and the principles developed within the international
and transnational organizations reflecting the will of the community of
113. See BOUTRos BOUTROS-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR DEMOCRATIZATION (1996). See also
Anne Peters, Global ConstitutionalismRevisited, 11 INT'L LEGAL THEORY 39 (2005). Professor Peters
notes that "international law used t be blind for constitutional principles within states. In contrast the
idea of constitutionalism implies that state sovereignty is gradually being complemented (if not substituted) by other guiding principles, notably the 'global common interest' and/or 'rule of law' and/or
'human security."' Id. at 49. On an argument for the international regulation of occupation through
which new constitutionalism may be expressed, see Jean L. Cohen, The Role OfInternationalLaw In
Post-Conflict Constitution-Making: Toward A Jus Post Bellum For "Interim Occupations", 51 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 497 (2006-2007). On the same for genocide crimes see NEAL REIMER, PROTECTION
AGAINST GENOCIDE: MISSION IMPOSSIBLE? 141-160 (Neal Riemer, ed., 2000) ("Nations have a crucial
role to play in the protection against genocide, and they should be encouraged to play this valuable
role. However, protecting against illegitimate intervention and securing the development of global constitutionalism call for primary use of global (UN) and regional organizations."). Id. at 155.
114. Indeed, academics now speak of the development of a common legal culture to supplement
the legal orders of the Member States. See, e.g., the essays in EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND
THE STATE (J. H. H. Weiler & Marlene Wind, eds., 2003).
115. The European Court of Human Rights provides a wealth of materials on its web site, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/.
116. For a discussion, see, e.g., THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS (David J. Harris & Stephen Livingstone, eds., 1998); John F. Stack, Jr., Human Rights in the Inter-American System:
The Struggle for Emerging Legitimacy?, in LAW ABOVE NATIONS: SUPRANATIONAL COURTS AND THE

LEGALIZATION OF POLITICS 99 (Mary L. Volcansek, ed., 1997).
117. For a discussion in the context of German constitutional law, see Frank Hoffmeister, Germany: Status of European Convention of Human Rights on Domestic Law, 4 ICON INT'L J. CONST. L.
722 (2006).
118. See, e.g., Joshua Bardavid, The Failure Of The State-CentricModel Of InternationalLaw And
The International Criminal Court, 15 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 9 (2002); Leila Nadya Sadat, S. Richard
Carden, The New InternationalCriminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381 (2000).
119. See, e.g., Robin West, Human Capabilitiesand Human Authorities, 4 GREEN BAG 2nd 207,
213 (2001); Rett R. Ludwikowski, Constitutionalization Of Human Rights In Post-Soviet States And
Latin America: A Comparative Analysis, 33 GA. J. IlT'L & COMP. L. 1, 109 (2004).
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states, became the basis of a system of structural control of constitutionalism. This understanding was backed by the moral and military power of
the Allied Powers of the Second World War, now exerted within the insti-

tutional context of a growing web of transnational and international organizations, and clothed in the forms of international formal and customary
law. The effect was revolutionary. The traditional notions of sovereignty
were destabilized. No longer was it entirely respectable for a state to claim
that it could organize itself in any way in chose and deal internally with its
relationship to its people without constraint, when the adoption of a constitutional form was only skin deep. 20
The synthesis of a Post-War system of norms applicable to all nation
state constitutions, if they were to be recognized as legitimate by the international community of nations, constituted an expansion and constitutionalization of sources of a set of norms of human behavior, and of the
necessary constraints in the development of systems of institutions with effects on people. From the time of the establishment of the United Nations
it dovetailed with expansion of role and legitimacy of international law and
governance. 12 And ultimately, it served as a mechanism for the control of
state behavior either internally against its own citizens (the Nazi problem)
or externally against other states (the Japanese militarism problem).
The mechanism paralleled a customary or common law system, though
it could also claim a consistency with sources in civil law systems, l2 2 and
could derive legitimacy form its relationship to the forms (if not the content
necessarily) of customary international law. 123 The rules formation for
principles of transnational constitutionalism appeared to mirror those of
120. See Isaac I. Dore, Constitutionalism and the Postcolonial State in Africa: A Rawlsian Approach, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1301, 1303-1305 (1997).
121.

See, e.g., ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE MODERN WORLD 120-140 (1948).

122. Thus, for example, there is an echo in transnational constitutionalism to the natural law underpinnings of civil law. One of the more influential comparative law texts notes that the French "Code
Civil is based on the tenet of natural law that there are autonomous principles of nature, quite independent of religious belief, from which one can infer a system of legal rules which, if given intelligible form
according to a plan, can act as the basis for an orderly, reasonable and moral life in society." KONRAD
ZWEIGERT AND HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 88 (Tony Weir, trans., 3rd ed.,
1988). See also note 8, supra.
123. On customary international law, see, e.g., Steven R. Ratner, Is InternationalLaw Impartial?,
11 LEGAL THEORY 39, 57 (2005). This is not to suggest that customary international law is either stable
or accepted by the international community. The concept is both fluid and subject to intense attack in
many quarters. An interesting angle on the value of customary international law, from the perspective
of the creation of a norm system of transnational constitutionalism is bound up in the relationship
between "critical mass" and notions of legitimacy and authority.
"However, in the same way that a social norm may be transformed into a legal norm, a social
movement may end up defining itself in legal terms. In fact, some have argued that law is, and
should be, a critical player in the creation and sustenance of social movements, while others
maintain that "social movements and juridical law are fundamentally in tension." I need not
join that debate here. For my purpose, it is sufficient to note that whether they ultimately
constitute themselves legally or not, the emergence of social movements is subject to the same
logic of critical mass as are social behavior and social norms."
Adeno Addis, The Concept Of Critical Mass In Legal Discourse, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 97, 146-147
(2007).
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customary international law. It evidences characteristics of a sort of common law or organic law of constitutional restraint, applicable to all states,
in which all states have a role/stake in its construction, and is meant to
produce constitutional convergence at least with respect to frameworks/
objectives.
Transnational constitutionalism as a mechanism of control of national
popular will work because it effectively restrains expression of that will by
recourse to a higher authority-that of all people constituted in the family
of nations-in the form of a developed set of principles of political organization. 124 Thus, the source of the limiting rules was located outside the

control of any individual state, but within the control of the community of
nations. Likewise, the limiting framework was external to any individual
state constitutional system. It was secular. 125 It could be changed but only

by the consensus of the community of nations. As Jonathan Miller noted in
connection with Argentine constitutionalism: "In a sense, international
human rights law provides the legitimacy that might once have found in
natural law, and much of the discussion at the Convention places interna26
tional human rights law on a pedestal very similar to that of natural law.'
The system tends towards self-enforcement within states through com-

munication between states by reference to international normative standards. It began to depend on the growth of a transnational judicial elite

and the construction of a transnational jurisprudence of constitutional

norms. 127 It is also aided as more and more of the issues of constitutional
states are juridified 2 8 Thus, a transnational level, constitutionalism serves
124. Though subject to any number of iterations, it has become a reductionist commonplace to
describe the form of transnational constitutionalism as comprising the two principle objectives of the
Allies after the Second World War: no government apparatus may be vested with timitless power and
political organization requires a recognition and protection of a set of individual rights. See Issa G.
Shivji, State and Constitutionalism:A New DemocraticPerspective, in STATE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM:
AN AFRICAN DEBATE ON DEMOCRACY 27, 28 (Issa G. Shivji, ed., 1991).
125. Law as a universal concept of order could free itself from a religious foundation either
through an invocation of natural law, as it had authoritatively done in the West since at least the 18th
century, or as Roberto Unger, suggested, by invoking a theology of transcendence, a belief in group
pluralism, tied to the idea of the liberal secular state. See ROBERTO M. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN
SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY 66-76, 83-86, 176-81 (1976).
126. Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology Of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History And
Argentine Examples To Explain The Transplant Process, 51 AM. J. CoMP. L. 839, 863 (2003). See generally, THE GLOBALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Jean-Marc Coicaud, Michael W. Doyle, & Anne-Marie
Gardner eds., 2003).
127. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of TransjudicialCommunication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99
(1994); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Envisioning a Global Legal Culture, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (2003); J.
Patrick Kelly, The Changing Process of InternationalLaw and the Role of the World Court, 11 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 129 (1989).
128. Ran Hirschl, The New Constitutionalism and the Judicializationof Pure Politics Worldwide, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 721 (2006). Early in the history of the German Basic Law of 1949, Arthur von
Mehren wrote of the German Federal Constitutional Court as "the central institution in the experiment
with constitutionalism initiated by the Basic Law-it is 'the final step in building a state based upon the
rule of law (Rechtsstaat)."' Arthur T. von Mehren, Constitutionalism in Germany-The First Decision
of the New ConstitutionalCourt, 1 AM. J. CoMp. L. 70, 78 (1952) (quoting, in part, the remarks of a Herr
von Merkatz in the debate on the Law of the Constitutional Court).
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as a meta-system with its own mechanics of elaboration, interpretation, legitimacy and authority. 129 The system represents the great expression of
the collective genius of humanity-the great flowering of the humanism
that started in the Renaissance in Europe and acquired its current form
during the European Enlightenment with its focus on (1) secularism, (2)
positivism, and (3) scientism (reason or rationality).,3 °
Yet, for all that theoretical cohesion, the system of transnational constitutionalism was uneven in its application. From its beginnings in 1945
there were questions of effectiveness: "Whether this advance proves to be
real rather than apparent will depend upon the sincerity of the German
people and the effectiveness of the international control by which they are
held to their own professions." '' Some states rejected the full implications
of the system (the United States and the People's Republic of China among
them).' 32 Other states never enjoyed the freedom to set their own norms
(especially in the decolonizing world) so that the circumstances that contributed to successful transplantation in Japan and Germany had the opposite effect. 3 3 Many states continue to resist internationalization of law, at
least at the margins. The great debates over the value and effectiveness of
reservations to treaties-especially on constitutional grounds (upholding
the supremacy of internal law) or shar'ia grounds (upholding the
supremacy of religious over natural, secular or communal law) provide two
example. 1 34 In some respects, then, the system described appeared more
aspirational than real until the 1980s, and remains very much contigent into
the 21st century.
Still, from the 1980s, the system began to appear to have some success
in limiting state power. This power was reflected in both the discrediting of
the military regimes of Latin America and the marginalization and ultimate
dismantling of a constitutionally formally legitimate system of apartheid in
129. In this sense the system is effectively autonomous and transnational in character. See Larry
CatA Backer, Principlesof TransnationalLaw: The Foundationsof an Emerging Field, LAW AT THE END
OF THE DAY, March 9, 2007, available at http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com.
130. See GERALD R. CRAGG,THE CHURCH AND THE AGE OF REASON 1648-1789 235-239 (1970).

131. Lawrence Preuss, Editorial Comment: InternationalLaw in the Constitution of the Lander in
the American Zone in Germany, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 888, 899 (1947).
132. Americans, for example, continue to treat their constitutional state as requiring an inward
looking historicist approach, even as American political elites constructed and supported outward looking constitutionalism abroad. See, e.g., Thomas B. McAffee, Restoring The Lost World Of Classical
Legal Thought: The Presumption In Favor Of Liberty Over Law And The Court Over The Constitution,
75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1499 (2007).

133. Thus, for example, Ruth Gordon argues that constitutionalism in Sub-Saharan Africa was
doomed to trouble "in part because the postcolonial order was usually built on foreign paradigms that
had little or no foundation in the myriad of cultures of the peoples they were to govern. Postcolonial
institutions were prescribed on top of still-existing coercive anti-democratic structures of the colonial
era." Ruth Gordon, Growing Constitutions,1 U. PA. J. CONsT. L. 528, 532 (1999) (postcolonial constitutions "appear to have been doomed to fail from the outset."). Id. at 533).
134. See discussion in United Nations, International Law Commission. Report of the International
Law Commission Fifty-ninth session (7 May-5 June and 9 July-10 August 2007) General Assembly Official Records Sixty-second session Supplement No. 10 (A/62/10). Id. at 84-86 (on reservations grounded
in local constitution); Id. at 86-87 (on the so-called shari'a reservation).
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South Africa. They also influenced post Soviet constitutionalism in Eastern Europe. 1 35 These changes gave rise to the first flowering in so-called
third generation constitutions, exemplified by those of Argentina, and
South Africa. These constitutions are characterized by a strong adherence
to principles of substantive and process rule of law ordering in the construction of state institutions. They are also self consciously focused on the
mechanisms of transnational constitutionalism for the elaboration of national constitutional interpretation. Thus, for example, the South African
Constitution elevates certain international agreements within the South
African Constitutional order and requires or permits its Constitutional
court to consider decisions and interpretations of other constitutional systems in interpreting the South African Constitution.1 3 6 And the Argentine
Constitution provides that its provisions are subject to certain international
agreements, conventions and systems of supra national governance.' 37
Though neither system has been free of criticism, at least at a formal level
each evidences the ways in which constitutionalism has sought to become
bounded within networks of normative constrains expressed in law sourced
outside the state.
Within these systems religion has a very precise role. Within post War
transnational constitutionalist systems religion was meant to be understood
as just another right to protect. As against the universalizing framework of
transnational constitutionalism, with its focus on human rights, democracy,
participation and non-discrimination, religion was viewed as important but
parochial.1 3 Religion divides and does not compromise. It tolerates but
cannot accept equality among those of different faiths. And it used religion
to emphasize its fundamental character of supra religious.' 3 9 Within the
hierarchy of norms, the religious was treated as subordinate to universal
135. See, e.g., Rett R. Ludwikowski, ConstitutionalizationOf Human Rights In Post-Soviet States
And Latin America: A Comparative Analysis, 33 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (2004).
136. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1996, available at http://
www.concourt.gov.za/site/theconstitution/thetext.htm (see especially Arts 39 and Preamble). The South
African courts have nicely elaborated and applied this system. Among the most well developed examples of this jurisprudence is the case in which the South African court considered the constitutionality
of the death penalty. State v. T. Makwanyane and M. Mchunu, Case No. CCT/3/94 (1995); available at
http://law.gsu.edu/ccunningham/fall03/DeathPenalty-SouthAfrica-Makwanyane.htm.
137. See Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology Of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History
And Argentine Examples To Explain The Transplant Process, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 839 (2003); Janet
Koven Levit, The Constitutionalization of Human Rights in Argentina: Problem or Promise?, 37
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 281 (1999).
138. See, e.g., Louis HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 68-72 (1999) (suggesting a connection between human rights as articulated after the Second World War, state organization and development as
currently conceived).
139. Even where the primacy of a former official religion is acknowledged, the primacy of the
state with respect to its interactions with religion in general is acknowledge. Thus, for example, the
Constitution of Peru provides "el Estado reconoce a la Iglesia Cat6lica como elemento importante en la
formaci6n hist6rica, cultural y moral del Perti, y le presta su colaboraci6n. El Estado respeta otras
confesiones y puede establecer formas de colaboraci6n con ellas." CoNsTIrtrrION OF PERU (1993 as
amended), art. 50, available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Peru/per93reforms05.html
("the state acknowledges the Catholic Church as an important element in the historical formation,
culture and norms of Peru, and lends it its support. The State respects other religious confessions and
may establish formal collaborations with them.").
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secular and political norms. Yet religion, and institutionalized religion, did
not acquiesce, either in the West or in the non-Christian world. Still, institutions communicate.1 4 ° And the forms of institutional expression might
converge. Secular transnational constitutionalism clearly evidenced success
on the ground. Would it be possible to mimic the pattern but substitute a
different set of normative frameworks? It appears that the answer is increasingly-yes. It is to that question, and to the role of religion in the
formation of an answer that the article turns to next.
III.

"IN

THE NAME OF GOD, THE MERCIFUL, THE COMPASSIONATE":
THE RISE OF THEOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM

In accordance with the sacred verse of the Qur'an ("This
your community is a single community, and I am your Lord,
so worship Me" [21:92]), all Muslims form a single nation,
and the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has the
duty of formulating its general policies with a view to cultivating the friendship and unity of all Muslim peoples, and it
must constantly strive to bring about the political, economic,
and cultural unity of the Islamic world. 4 1
The template established in the construction of the German and Japanese post War constitutions has proven to be quite influential. And, indeed, by the third quarter of the 20th century, a lively field of transnational
constitutionalism had developed to study and comment on the increasingly
well understood patterns of governance and rule of law systems engendered by the post War transnational constitutional order.'4 2 The focus of
this constitutionalism was transnational and secular. It was grounded on
An interesting example in the West concerned the long campaign by the Vatican to have included
in the proposed Constitutional Treaty for the European Union at least a reference to the religious
foundations of Europe. "The Holy See believes the draft of the European Constitution has two flaws: It
recognizes neither the continent's Christian heritage nor the proper role of churches." Holy See Believes EU Constitution is Flawed, Zenit.org (Nov. 20, 2003) available at http://www.goacom.org/overseas-digest/Religion/Pope% 20JPII/vat&eu03.htm.
140. Cf. Drury Stevenson, To Whom is the Law Addressed?, 21 YALE L. & POL'v REV. 105, 144145 (2003) ("Society is understood as a self-regulating system of communication ... specialized cycles
of communication have developed out of the general cycle of communication. Some have become so
thoroughly independent that they have to be regarded as second-order social autopoietic systems. They
have constituted autonomous units of communication which, in turn, are self-reproductive. They produce their own elements, structures, processes, and boundaries. They construct their own environment,
and define their own identity... Social subsystems are operatively closed, but cognitively open to the
environment. The legal system in its present form can be viewed as a second-order autopoietic social
system," referencing GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM 69-70 (1993). Id. at 106.

And reference to a particular religion remains unlikely in the more recent modifications to the treaty
structure of the European Union. See Treaty of Lisbon (proposed). See Presidency of the European
Union, Portugal 2007, European leaders approve Treaty of Lisbon, Oct. 19, 2007, available at http://
www.eu2007.pt/UE/vENfNoticiasDocumentos/20071019soc.htm.
141. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN art. 11: available at http://
www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution.php.
142. For American academic forays in this newly constituted field, see, e.g., VICKI C. JACKSON,
MARK V. TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1999); MICHEL ROSENFELD, ANDRAS SAJO,
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the rules of behavior derived from the understandings and sensibilities of
the community of states. In this sense it was self-referencing and meta sovereign-the system essentially moved ultimate discretion up from any individual state to the community of states.
Still, the pattern of constitutionalism-its grounding in larger social
principles in the constitution of states, and its deployment of process of
structure in the constitution of social and procedural rule of law governments, was not inherently tied to the normative structure on which the Allied Powers, and thereafter the United Nations relied. Any number of
other transnational sources could be invoked for the construction of "rule
of law" constitutional systems. Among the more powerful of these, and the
most successful since the end of the Second World War, has been theocratic
transnational constitutionalism. "However hazy, a Middle Eastern pattern
exists, which, for particular historical reasons connected with colonialism
and the fragmentation of the area, needs some attention: the craving of
built on a real or imagined Arab or Islamic
people for a unity
43
commonwealth."1
For the purposes of this article, modern origins trace back to very recent history-the Iranian revolution and adoption of the Iranian Constitution of 1979.'14 This assumption, of course, is subject to a number of
important caveats. First, 1979 is arbitrary. The roots of modern theocratic
constitutionalism, at least in the dar al Islam, go back at least as far as the
Pan-Arab nationalism of the 19th century and Persian resistance to Westernization prior to WWI. Second, constitutionalism has some roots in
traditional modern form within the dar al Islam. Traditional constitutionalism existed in models of varying influence from Egypt to Saudi Arabia to
Morocco. 1 45 The Ottoman model was also influential, especially after 1923
and the reconstitution of Turkey as a modern secular republic. 1 46 Third,
theocracy comes in a wide variety of flavors. Though the article focuses on
Islam as the most dynamic and successful current form (at least successful
in translating its forms into modern discursive forms). But other universalizing faiths might also provide other foundations: Christianity, Hinduism,
Buddhism, etc. But for the moment, Islamic theocratic constitutionalism
presents the most developed form of this branch of transnational constitutional development, and for that reason is worth careful study.
SUSANNE BAER, NORMAN DORSEN, COMPARATIVE

CONSTITUTIONALISM:

CASES AND MATERIALS

(2003).
143. Chibli Mallat, On The Specificity Of Middle Eastern Constitutionalism,38 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 13, 16 (2006).
144.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, available at http://www.irancham-

ber.com/government/laws/constitution.php.
145. Indeed, the Pakistani Constitution of 1973 had already constitutionalized Islam within the
framework of a state formally constituting a rule of law democratic government apparatus. See Anne
Elizabeth Meyer, Islam and the State, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1015 (1991).
146. On the difficulties of pluralism in the construction of the modern Turkish state, see Ihsan
Yilmaz, Secular Law and the Emergence of Unofficial Turkish Islamic Law, 56 MIDDLE E.J. 113-131

(2002).
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Islamic theocracy provides the most developed form of post War constitutionalism applied using a different normative foundation. 4 7 Again,
this must be understood in terms of the construction looking for first systematization and institutionalizations of universal system limiting constitutional powers of state. What makes the Iranian Constitution of 1979
special for my purposes is the way it modernizes the language and institutional context of theocratic state governance. It adapts overarching
transcendental system of norms to modern language of Process Constitutionalism.14 8 Together they produce a Sozialstaad very different from that
envisioned either by the Americans after 1945 or Western Constitutionalism as developed thereafter.
Like modern constitutions grounded in principles of transnational constitutionalism, the Iranian constitution appears to protect against arbitrary
use of state power. The Constitution gives the power to enact legislation to
the representatives of the people. 149 The Iranian Constitution also provides for a system of institutionalized and nominally democratically based
legislation adopted in accordance with constitutional requirements. 150 Like
modern constitutions it also imposes limits on power the people can give
the state Substance Constitutionalism' 5 1
Yet, unlike constitutions adopted under Post-WWII framework, the
Iranian Constitution embraces the substantive (moral/ethical) restraints of
Shi'a Islam.1 52 "This principle applies absolutely and generally to all articles of the Constitution as well as to all other laws and regulations, and the
147. As Nigerian Justice Wali suggested: "Islamic Law is not the same as customary Law as it
does not belong to any particular tribe. It is a complete system of universal Law, more certain and
permanent and more universal than the English Common Law." 1 SCNJ 73 (1999), quoted in
Abdulmumini Adebayo Oba, The Sharia Court of Appeal in Northern Nigeria: The Continuing Crisisof
Jurisdiction, 52 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 859, 881 (2004).

148. In this context the very modern and very American process school provides an insight in the
current language of rule of law process constitutionalism:
The legal process school focuses primary attention on who is, or ought, to make a given legal
decision, and how that decision is, or ought, to be made.... The question what is or ought to
be the substantive law governing citizen behavior in a given area is no longer the sole, or even
the dominant, object of legal analysis. Rather, legal process analysis illuminates how substantive norms governing primary conduct shape, and are in turn shaped by, organizational structure and procedural rules.
Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688, 691 (1989) (reviewing PAUL M. BATOR ET AL.,
HART AND WESCHLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (3d ed, 1988)). See also
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 38-41 (1980).

149.

See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN art. 57 (powers of government

are vested in the legislature, judiciary and executive) and art. 58 (legislative functions to be exercised
through the Islamic Consultative Assembly).
150. The legislative power is then elaborated at Id. arts. 62-99.
151. The substantive limitations on state power are elaborated at Chapter III of the Constitution,
arts. 19-31. These mimic the standard description of basic rights in Post-War constitutions. But, rather
than grounded in transnational constitutionalist principles, these rights are grounded "in conformity
with Islamic criteria." Id. at art. 20 (equal protection of the laws); 21 (rights of women); 24 (press
freedom except when "detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam"); 27 (public gatherings,
same as art. 24); 28 (right to choose occupation, "if not contrary to Islam and the public interest").
152.

See e.g., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN art. 12:

The official religion of Iran is Islam and the Twelver Ja'fari school [in usual al-Din and fiqh],
and this principle will remain eternally immutable. Other Islamic schools, including the
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fuqaha' of the Guardian Council are judges in this matter. '1 5 3 And, the
constitutional systems set up an institutional framework for religious oversight of political activity.154 Thus, for example, the work of the Consultative
Assembly is overseen by a Guardian Council,155 "with a view to safeguard
the Islamic ordinances and the Constitution, [and] in order to examine the
compatibility of the legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly with Islam."1'5 6 Indeed, the representative legislature "does not hold
any legal status if there is no Guardian Council in existence." 15' 7 This is
constitutionalism of a very different order. It rejects conformity to international norms, or an obligation to bend behavior to the standards of the
international community on the implementation and acceptance of certain
norms-principally involving human rights, subordination and the construction of democratic governance institutions. It serves a different community, that of the faithful. The rest of the world is irrelevant, except to
the extent of their power to intervene in internal Iranian affairs.
There are several key features that distinguish the 1979 Iranian Constitution from other constitutional efforts. The fundamental difference is the
source of substantive constitutional norms. Like the dominant transnational constitutionalist system, Iranian constitutionalism is based on a system of universal substantive norms. But while the emerging system of
transnational constitutionalism is grounded in global secular, internationalist human rights norms based on common values among the family of nations, Iranian constitutionalism is founded on Shi'a Islam. 158 As a
consequence, the system of checks and balances common to secular transnational constitutionalist systems is substantially different. While the former constructs its state apparatus as self-referencing and internally
complete-all elements of governance are incorporated as a formal part of
the state apparatus, within Iranian constitutionalism the state apparatus is
distinct from and subordinate to the apparatus of religious governance.
Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki, Hanbali, and Zaydi, are to be accorded full respect, and their followers
are free to act in accordance with their own jurisprudence in performing their religious rites.
These schools enjoy official status in matters pertaining to religious education, affairs of personal status (marriage, divorce, inheritance, and wills) and related litigation in courts of law.
In regions of the country where Muslims following any one of these schools of fiqh constitute
the majority, local regulations, within the bounds of the jurisdiction of local councils, are to be
in accordance with the respective school of fiqh, without infringing upon the rights of the
followers of other schools.
See also arts. l(sovereignty of Qur'onic justice); 2 (belief in "Divine revelation and its fundamental role
in setting forth the law"); and 4 (need to base all laws and regulations on Islam). The critical provision
is art. 5 that vests ultimate authority on a religious leader.
153. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN art. 4.
154. Said Saffari, The Legitimation of the Clergy's Right to Rule in the Iranian Constitution of 1979,
20(1) BRIT. J. OF MID. E. STUD. 64-82 (1993).
155. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN at art. 91.
156. Id.
157. Id. at art. 93.
158. Thus for example, in the section of the Constitution elaborating the rights of national sovereignty, the Constitution starts with the declaration that "absolute sovereignty over the world and man
belongs to God ..... The people are to exercise this divine right in the manner specified in the following articles." THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN art. 56.
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While there are substantial areas of overlap, the two systems are distinct.
And the apparatus of religious governance is hierarchically supreme within
the sphere of traditional state governance. 1 59 Third, the governed-the
people of Iran-have no power to interrogate and alter the formulation of
the basic substantive norms on which political governance is founded. That
basic norm structure derives from a divine source and is unalterable, except
by that source. The people are permitted only one response to these

norms-obedience.160 But of course, the people, at least within Islam, do
have a significant and complex role in the elaboration and application of
that system both as applied to the constitution of the state and in its role as

legal code governing every aspect of life. 6 '
Still, despite those differences, the Iranian theocratic Constitution resembles modern constitutions, and adheres to the current pattern of modern constitutionalism in certain respects. First, the forms of "rule of law"

constitutionalism are observed. The government constituted is in some
great sense democratic.'

62

There is a significant element of separation of

powers in the construction of the state apparatus.

63

Second, the substan-

tive elements of modern constitutionalism are also observed." 6 Human
rights are enshrined in the constitution and protected. 65 The power to petition the government is preserved. 6 6 Third, the power of the state and its

governance organs are strictly limited. In this sense the Iranian constitution follows emerging models of transnational constitutionalism. The difference-and a critical one to be sure-is the source of the norms
159. See Said Saffari, The Legitimation of the Clergy's Right to Rule in the Iranian Constitution of
1979, 20(1) BRIT. J. OF MID. E. STUD. 64-82 (1993).

160. Republican principles are still consonant with this system-it is just that the interrogation of
basic norms sourced in Islam are now outside the bounds of political discourse, and with respect to
those, the citizen must yield to the "priest." Said Saffari has nicely described the origins of an institutionalized elaboration of priestly government in Shi'a Islam, and its relation to the construction of a
political state. Said draws out the foundationally distinct quality of universal theocratic constitutionalism and its relationship to government: "[T]he Islamic government is based on an ideology different
from that of a democratic republic. What . .. is indeed appropriate for a democratic republic ... fails to

meet the requirements of Islam." Said Saffari, The Legitimation of the Clergy's Right to Rule in the
Iranian Constitution of 1979, 20(1) BRIT. J. OF MID. E. STUD. 64, 73 (1993) (on the religious basis of
priestly government in Shi'a Islam). Id. at 65. See generally Larry CatA Backer, Religion as Object and
the Grammar of Law, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 229 (1998).

161. The concept and operation of the 'ummah is well known within Islam. While its actual invocation and effect are highly contested, and fluid, it does provide at least in theory a vehicle through
which the people can, as a whole, directly intervene in the elaboration and application of the unalterable divine command. In reality, of course, the 'ummah system is tempered by an ancient and complex
system of elaboration by scholars and others, the size and power of whose following, may also be
invested with a certain legitimacy and authority. See generally, Christopher Stewart, From "Mother of
the World" to the "Third World" and Back Again: The Harmonization Cycle Between Islam and the
Global Economy in HARMONIZING LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION:
GENCE, RESISTANCE 279-308 (2007).

CONVERGENCE,

DIVER-

162. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, arts. 6-8, though subject to the
ultimate limitations of the supreme religious leader. See Id. art. 5.
163. See Id. arts. 56-63, though, again, in accordance with the limitations of Islam generally as
exercised through the religious leader pursuant to Article 5 and Articles 90-99.
164. See Id. arts. 19-55.
165. See Id. arts. 19-42.
166. See Id. arts 26-27 (though they are ambiguous in the extent of the protections offered).
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constituting those boundaries of governance and the mechanisms for engaging with those norms.167
The standard response of the secularizing international community
was to explain away the developments in Iran in one of two ways. The first
suggested that Iranian theocratic constitutionalism was a form of retrograde traditionalism to be overcome by steady progress (the "we will talk it
to death" strategy).168 The second was to play definition games. The Iranian theocracy could not be considered constitutionalism at all, and thus
marginalized and delegitimated, it could be ignored. 169 And a variation of

this approach was to suggest the possibilities for convergence within a protean Islamic legal structure. 170 The third was to view this form of religiously
based constitutionalism as "sui generis"-explained away by the special

circumstances of the 1979 revolution against the Shah,' 7 ' or by the special
characteristics of Shi'a Islam. t7 1 This latter explanation was particularly
odd in light of Sunni constitutionalism in other parts of the Middle East.1 73

And indeed, only some commentators in the West embraced the notion
that "[t]he Iranian set-up, whose toned-down parallels can be found in Pakistan and Egypt, offers the most concrete Islamic challenge to classical
167. See Jason Lawrence Reimer, Comment: Finding Their Own Voice?: The Afghanistan Constitution: Influencing the Creation of a Theocratic Democracy, 25 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 343 (2006)

("During a meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Committee in 1982 investigating reports of
state-sponsored murder and torture, the leader of the Iranian delegation was questioned about Iran's
view on the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Sayed Hadi Khosrow- Shahi, the
leader of the delegation, replied that Iran believed in the 'supremacy of Islamic laws, which are universal' and when a law, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, comes in conflict with Islamic
laws, Iran would 'choose the divine laws."' ). Id. at 360.
168. See, e.g., Edna Boyle-Lewicki, Need World's Collide: The Hudad Crimes of Islamic Law and
InternationalHuman Rights, 13 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 43 (2000); Neil Shevlin, Velayat-E-Faqih in the Constitution of Iran: The Implementation of Theocracy, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 358 (1998).
169. See, e.g., ABBAS MILANI, MICHAEL McFAUL, & LARRY DIAMOND, BEYOND INCREMENTALism: A NEW STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH IRAN 23 (2005); Donna Arzt, Heroes or Heretics: Religious

Dissidents Under Islamic Law, 14 Wis. INT'L. L. J. 349 (1996) ("Iran's new constitution has turned the
notion of constitutionalism on its head, allowing it to serve as a warrant for, rather than a safeguard
against, tyranny."). Id. at 390.
170. See Louise Halper, Law, Authority and Gender in Post Revolutionary Iran, 54 BUFF. L. REV.
1137 (2007); Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash of Cultures or a
Clash With a Construct?, 15 MICH. J. I, 'LLAW 307 (1994); Anne Elizabeth Meyer, Islam and the State,
12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1015 (1991).

171. See, e.g., ROBIN WRIGHT, THE LAST GREAT REVOLUTION: TURMOIL AND TRANSFORMATION
(2000).
172. SHAUL BAKHASH, THE REIGN OF THE AYATOLLAHS: IRAN AND THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION
(Rev. Ed., 1990). He suggests that:
IN IRAN

Many members considered article 6, which treated sovereignty as stemming from the popular
will, to be in conflict with the vice-regency of the faqih. The constitution, however, left these
two concepts of sovereignty standing side by side in uneasy or-given a different perspective
-creative symbiosis. The 1906 constitution, at an earlier time and in similar fashion, had declared sovereignty to be a divine gift bestowed by the people on the monarch. The 1979 constitution was a reminder that seventy years after the Constitutional Revolution, Iranians were
still uncertain whether it was the people or God and the clerics who ruled.
Id. at 88.
173. For a discussion of Saudi constitutionalism, for example, see Abdulaziz H. AI-Fahad, Ornamental Constitutionalism: The Saudi Basic Law of Governance, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 375, 375 (2005). On
a comparison between Iranian and Saudi Islamic constitutionalism, see Chibi Mallat, On the Specificity
of Middle Eastern Constitutionalism,38 CASE W. RES.J. INT'L L. 13, 33-41 (2006).
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constitutionalism in the Middle East by allowing the judiciary-the Islamic
jurists of the 74Shi'i tradition-a key role as ultimate interpreter of the

constitution."1

For all that, the Iranian experience can be considered the heart and

real starting point for the legitimization of an increasingly important framework for drawing constitutions within Muslim majority states. This framework mimicked the form of transnational secular constitutionalism,
substituting for its organic and consensus based system of drawing founda-

tional constitutional substantive norms, a system grounded in the word of a
particular Deity whose ordinances had been institutionalized within one or

another institution of organized religion. Thus, for example, it might be
possible to suggest a connection between the principles of Iranian constitutionalism and the constitutional developments of states such as Nigeria, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Somalia, among others.1 75 As importantly, perhaps,
the Iranian model may have been influential in transnational efforts to internationalize a theocratic foundation of religious constitutionalism based
on Islam. Following the pattern for the construction of a legitimate frame-

work for supra-national substantive restraints on secular constitutionalism
grounded in contemporary global international organizations, the Islamic
Conference of Foreign Ministers adopted a Cairo Declarationon Human
Rights in Islam.176 The Cairo Declaration sought to elaborate a normative

framework for substantive transnational constitutionalism grounded in Islam, rather than in the system of state centered customary law of the PostWar international system. Its internationalist and substantive agenda were
unhidden.

177

Ironically, and perhaps perversely, the greatest evidence of its status as
a viable alternative to international humanistic universalism was perhaps
bound up in the adoption of theocratic constitutions for American administered Afghanistan and Iraq. Both of these constitutions were, from a certain American perspective, the product of a situation similar in vital
174. Chibli Mallat, On The Specificity Of Middle Eastern Constitutionalism,38 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 13, 34 (2006).

175. See Tad Stahnke & Robert C. Blitt, U.S. Comm'n On Int'l Religious Freedom, The ReligionState Relationship And The Right To Freedom Of Religion Or Belief: A Comparative Textual Analysis
Of The Constitutions Of PredominantlyMuslim Countries, Mar. 8, 2005, available at http://www.uscirf.
gov/countries/global/comparative constitutions/03082005/Study0305.pdf.
176. See The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, adopted and issued at the 19th Islamic
Conference of Foreign Ministers in Cairo, Aug. 5, 1990, available at http://www.religlaw.org/interdocs/
docs/cairohrislaml990.htm.
177. The Cairo Declarations is overtly patterned on the old community of civilized states approach to international law and behavior norms of early 20th century secular international law. But the
discursive trope is now utilized to privilege Islam as the source of universal substantive values which
must be embraced by the uncivilized non-Muslim world. This mimicry produced the declaration of the
Islamic Ummah's civilizing role in the world "to guide humanity confused by competing trends and
ideologies and provide solutions to the chronic problems of this materialistic civilization." Cairo Declaration, supra, Preamble. The provisions, themselves, recast traditional human rights protections as subject to the normative framework of Islam. Catalogued, they serve as a secondary elaboration of the
primary principles of religion, which can shape and limit the applicability of each. In this, Islam serves
the privileged role that in contemporary supa-national systems is reserved to the normative structure
embraced by the community of nations.
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respects to that facing American occupying forces in Japan in 1945. And it
was from a memory, now hazy, of those experiences, that the Americans
might have sought to draw. On the one hand, Americans were quick to
argue that the situation in conquered Iraq and Afghanistan were different
than that the Allies faced in conquered Japan and Germany. 178 What
Americans remembered was that "the democratic process is practicable
within the framework of a military occupation .... The relationship be-

tween the occupant and the occupied seemed eventually to be forgotten
over the feeling of an international fellowship among jurists' 179
who have in
common the ardent concern for the improvement of a law.
Yet, unlike the situation in the 1940s in Germany and Japan-which
reinforced the American inspired system of institutional internationalism
grounded in the higher substantive law of a community of nations within a
United Nations systems-this time the Americans appear to have contributed to the rejection of the very system they helped create in favor of fostering a different framework of transnational constitutionalism-one based
on universal religious substantive values. As such, Americans are not
merely returning to the traditional notion that conceptualizes constitutional
law as confined to the peculiar social constitution of the state in which it is
adopted. Instead, they appear to have changed the foundation of internationalism from secular consensus among the community of nations, to the
universalism of religion. And this was done in the name of fostering national freedom to choose and thus avoid constitutional impositions; the
great American project of the Americans to create a global secular transnational constitutionalism is discredited by another generation of Americans
with different goals and perspectives."'
Both the Iraqi and Afghani constitutions are products of direct interventions after a military conflict-like Germany and Japan. And also like
these predecessor constitutions, the Iraqi and Afghani constitutions both
178. Thus Noah Feldman, one of the non-Muslim foreigners more deeply involved in the process
could very carefully say,
Gone are the days when American legal officers could write the constitution of Japan, translate it into Japanese, and extract the acquiescence of such a Japanese government as existed
under the auspices of U.S. occupation and the reign of Supreme Allied Commander General
Douglas MacArthur. Today we are more likely to see documents like Ayatollah Ali Sistani's
fatwa of June 26, 2003 .... As a result of the fatwa, the unelected constitutional team named
by the Iraqi Governing Council produced not a constitution but a "Transitional Administrative Law" ("TAL") to function only until there could be elections and a new constitution
could be drafted and ratified. Although I served as an adviser to the TAL process both in an
independent capacity and, initially, for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad, I in
fact did not directly draft the Iraqi constitution, whatever might be the perception on West
Third Street. Old-fashioned imposed constitutionalism, it would seem, is dead.
Noah Feldman, Imposed Constitutionalism, 37 CONN. L. REv.857, 857-858 (2005). Accord, Kevin Reinhart & Gilbert S. Merritt, Reconstruction and Constitution Building in Iraq,37 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT'L

L. 765 (2004) ("That is the society into which we stepped when we occupied Iraq and the idea that we
can import democracy in the same sense that you might import a radio or a power plant, is simply a

mistake."). Id. at 767.
179. Alfred C. Oppler, The Reform of Japan's Legal and JudicialSystem UnderAllied Occupation,
24 WASH. L. REv. 290, 303 (1949).
180. Feldman, supra note 172, at 867-875.
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were nurtured by American influence. Both were also the products of local
action by the elites permitted to act for the occupied states by the occupying powers. In any case, American forces effectively controlled the territory of these states and had substantial effect on their respective post
invasion governments,'181 at the time that representative assemblies were
constituted in each state to construct new constitutional orders for each.
And both reflected assumptions about the authority of occupiers and the
extent of necessary constitutional modifications that suggest an American
willingness to foster theocratic constitutionalism in the dar al Islam.' 82
American elites played key roles in the construction of these constitutions, and particularly American diplomatic and academic elites. Thus, for
example, the offices of Zalmay Khalilzad, a naturalized U.S. citizen of
Pashtun origins, who played a role as the American representative to Afghanistan and to Iraq at the times of the drafting of the constitutions of
each.' 83 Also critical were American academics who, following a tradition
of American interventionism in constitutional matters stretching in modern
times from the fall of the Soviet Empire (but going back critically to the
work of the Americans in shaping the German and Japanese constitutions,
the legacy of which served as the great battlefield of later generations of
American interventionists, some of whom fought to enlarge the secular
human rights international universalism of those constitutions and others
who rejected it). But between 1945 and 2003 a great change appears to
have occurred within acceptable academic constitutionalism in the United
States. In place of the old American project of transnational constitutionalism, a new, more particularized and fragmentary constitutionalism appears to have arisen. Democracy now appears to solve all problems of selfconstitution, whatever its peculiar forms. Traditional postwar transnational
constitutionalism was termed "international" and reduced to a "European"
construct.' 84 This might appear to be an amazing claim in light of the origins of postwar constitutionalism. Nevertheless, notable among academics
advancing this new theory of anti-universalist constitutional universalism,
and serving as a great booster for the Iraqi constitution of 2005, was Noah
181. Professor Feldman explains:
In the Iraqi case, Ambassador Bremer unwittingly strengthened the Islamists' position when,
apparently in response to pressure from Senators Santorum and Brownback, he publicly
stated in comments to reporters in the Iraqi town of Hillah that the Iraqi constitution would
not be Islamic. This unfortunate statement had the effect of strengthening the hand of the
Islamists precisely because it reeked of imposed constitutionalism. Moreover, the publication
of the Afghan Constitution, which included the provision prohibiting laws that violated Islam,
revealed to Iraqi Islamists that the United States was prepared to accept such a formulation,
further strengthening their negotiating position.

Id. at 878-879.
182. "Beyond the basic impossibility of excluding state religion from the constitutions of these
majority-Muslim countries, the model of imposition was also unable to overcome further powerful
manifestations of the role of Islam in the constitutional texts." Id. at 878.
183. For a somewhat gushy account, see, for example, Jon Lee Anderson, American Viceroy:
Zalmay Khalilzad's Mission, THE NEW YORKER, DEC. 19, 2005, available at http://www.newyorker.coml
fact/content/articles/051219fajfact2.
184. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Two World Orders, 27 THE WILSON QUARTERLY 28 (2003)

(identifying international constitutionalism as a European construct). For a critique, see Anne Peters,
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Feldman, a law professor at New York University and former constitu-

tional adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad.' 85 Professor Feldman has also been involved in debates over the institutional role
of religion in the United States. t8 6 It is possible that his participation in

one affected his view on the other.
The Constitution of Afghanistan was adopted in 2004 after the con-

vening of the traditional Loya Jirga. 187 The adoption was presided over by
the person of last Afghan king, though substantially guided and effectively

approved first by the Americans, whose support was critical to the authority (and perhaps even the formal, though not necessarily effective, legitimacy) of the Afghani state apparatus installed after the defeat of the
Taliban led government.' 8 8 This was followed by a popular vote that approved the document. 1 89 The Constitution of Iraq was adopted Oct. 15,

2005, replacing an American inspired interim constitution (known as the
Law for Administration of the State).

90

The permanent Constitution was

adopted after conclusion of unsuccessful three-way negotiations between
the largest Iraqi ethnic and religious blocs-Sunni, Shi'a, and Kurds. The
document, though substantially the product of the people approved as rep-

resentatives of these three bloc by the American occupiers, effectively represented a three way deal between Kurds, Shi'a, (some) Sunni and the
Americans.' 9 a The document was subsequently approved by popular vote
and a government based on that document thereafter constituted with

Global Constitutionalism Revisited, 11 Ir'L LEGAL THEORY 39, 42-43 (2005). Yet Rubenfeld is symptomatic of American discomfort with the system they created a generation ago and over which they
increasingly have less influence as they seek a different path.
185.

See, e.g., NOAH FELDMAN, WHAT WE OWE IRAQ: WAR AND THE ETHICS OF NATION BUILD-

ING (2004). For a different approach that appears to have not quite overcome the now dominant American view of constitutionalism in the Muslim world, or a dominant institutional religious law view in the
dar al-Islam, see Lama Abu-Odeh, The Politics of (Mis)recognition: Islamic Law Pedagogy in American
Academia, 52 THE Am. J. COMP. L. 789 (2004).
186. NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM AND WHAT WE
SHOULD Do ABOUT IT (2005).

187. See Golnaz Esfandiari, Afghanistan: Loya Jirga Approves Constitution, But Hard Part May
Have Only Just Begun, RADIO FREE EUROPE, Jan. 5, 2004, available at http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/ 2004/01/a2ad922a-adlf-4194-8b43-bf5b47f5427e.html.
188. Early in the process of overthrowing the Taliban regime it was reported that "A number of
people in the West have argued that only Zahir has the standing to unite the Afghan people, primarily
as a symbol of a more peaceful past." Melinda Henneberger, A Nation Challenged: The Afghan Opposition; Ex-King and Rebels to Hold Special Council, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2001, available at http://query.ny
times.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9DODE7DF133DF931A35753C1A9679C8B63&n=Top/Reference/
Times%20Topics/People/Z/Zahir%2OShah,%2OMohammed.
189. See Steven Graham, A New Constitutionfor Afghanistan, CBS NEwS, Jan. 26, 2004, available
at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/01/02/world/main591116.shtml.
190. See IraqisAgree on New Constitution, BBC NEWS ONLINE, March 8, 2004, available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/middleeast/3541875.stm (BBC's Middle East analyst, Roger Hardy, says the
interim constitution is remarkably progressive by the standards of the Middle East, seeking to strike a
balance between respect for Islam and regard for liberal democratic rights). See generally, Ashley S.
Deeks, Matthew D. Burton, Iraq's Constitution: A Drafting History, 40 CORNELL Ir'L L.J. 1 (2007)
(the authors were Legal Adviser and Deputy Legal Adviser, respectively, at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad during Iraq's constitution drafting process).
191. The politics of the process of constitutional development are nicely summarized in Noah
Feldman & Roman Martinez, ConstitutionalPolitics and Text in the New Iraq: An Experiment in Islamic
Democracy, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 886-901 (2006). The Sunni position was at best equivocal. See
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muted fanfare in the Western press. 192 However, the outcome of these negotiations, the legitimacy of the popular approval process and the authority
and legitimacy of the constitution thus produced are highly contested.19 3
Like the Iranian constitution, both the Iraqi and Afghani constitutions

speak the language of post WWII constitutionalism in its process and substance aspects. Both enshrine principles of process constitutionalism, that
the rule of law is a fundamental part of governance (state rule through
law). 194 Both also embrace substance constitutionalism also embraced:
sensitive to human rights constraints. a9 5 Thus, for example, authoritative

academic voices in the United States have emphasized the textual commitment of the Iraqi Constitution to the foundational principles of Islam, democracy, human rights and pluralism-read horizontally, against a
backdrop of the leaders of a majority of the population with a more hierarchical reading of these principles.' 9 6 The Iraqi constitution declares law

supreme, 9 7 yet this supreme law is in turn supreme only when it does not
contradict established provisions of Islam, principles of democracy, rights
and freedoms stipulated in the Constitution or repudiates the guarantee of
the Islamic identity of the majority of Iraqis. 98

Both constitutions have been touted as great experiments in Islamic
democracy. "Indeed, it is fair to say that the charter self-consciously aims
to integrate Islamic values into the country's political life while retaining
the separation of powers, checks and balances, and human rights guaran-

tees that are the hallmark of secular and democratic constitutions around
the world."1 99 Academics in the West seek somehow to reconcile the

human rights values inherent in the framework of transnational constitutionalism, with the rights framework of Islam. °° Or to show that progressive courts under such a system can reconcile Islamic jurisprudence to the

requirement of secular international human rights law in the interpretation
Jonathan Finer & Omar Fekeiki, Iraqis Finish Draft Charter That Sunnis Vow to Defeat, The Washington Post, Aug. 29, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/28/
AR2005082800268.html.
192. See Steven C. Welsh, Iraq ConstitutionalReferendum, CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION,
Oct. 17, 2005, available at http://www.cdi.org/news/law/iraq-referendum-101705.cfm; Kirk Semple &
Robert F. Worth, Early Signs Show Iraqis' Approval of Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/17/internationallmiddleeast/17iraq.ready.html.
193. See, e.g., Herbert Docena, Iraq's Neo Liberal Constitution, FOREIGN POLICY IN Focus, Sept.
2, 2005, available at http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/492.
194. Thus the Iraqi constitution provides for separation of powers in the Western sense of a legislative, judicial and executive power. See Iraqi Constitution art. 47.
195. Thus the Iraqi constitution provides broad ranging provisions securing individual rights and
liberties. See Iraqi Constitution arts. 14-46. Privacy rights, for example, are protected-as long as personal privacy "does not contradict the rights of others and public morals." Id. art. 17. Public morals, of
course, is a matter regulated by the tenets of Islam. See id, art. 2.
196. See Feldman, supra note 185, at 886-887 (political position of major parties), 901-906 (Islam),
907-910 (human rights), 916-918 (judiciary).
197. Iraqi Constitution art. 5 ("The law is supreme. The people are the source of authorities and
its legitimacy.").
198. Id. art. 2.
199. See Feldman, supra note 185, at 884.
200. See, e.g., Mohamed Y. Mattar, Unresolved Questions In The Bill Of Rights Of The New Iraqi
Constitution:How Will The Clash Between Human Rights" And "Islamic Law" Be Reconciled In Future

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 27:11

of Islamic Constitutions.2 °1 Yet there has been strong criticism as well for
this exercise in the illogic of a presumption that secular transnational
human rights based constitutions can somehow overcome the framework of
a different normative framework built into the constitution itself, one
grounded in religious institutions and beliefs.2 °2 Both share a common
bond to what has been called the master narrative of Western understanding of post conflict constitutionalism that suggests a progression from barbarity to enlightenment (in native garb) for the peoples' of both places with
the success of their respective contact with the superior military forces of
the occupying powers.20 3

Legislative Enactments And Judicial Interpretations?,30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 126 (2006). The solutions
proposed remain grounded in secular, institutional and political frameworks:
While the new Iraqi Constitution is to be considered a step forward, it leaves, perhaps intentionally, many questions unresolved, especially in defining the limits that Islamic Law may
impose on the exercise of the various human rights enumerated in the Constitution. The answers to many of these questions depended on the legislative process that will commenced
when the Constitution was approved by the people of Iraq. It will also depend upon the judicial interpretation of its various provisions, especially those that establish constitutional rights
for the Iraqi people. Finally, it will depend upon the degree to which ordinary Iraqis are educated about these rights and if civil society holds the government accountable to upholding
these rights. In all cases, the Iraqi people should be fully aware of their constitutional rights.
Non-governmental organizations and other members of civil society have the vital duty of
engaging in this educational initiative.
Id. at 157. It is not clear, as I am suggesting, that the focus ought to be on the institutions of the
government or the political process. The Constitution vest critical authority in that sphere to the institutions and apparatus of religion.
201. See Clark B. Lombardi & Nathan J. Brown, Do Constitutions Requiring Adherence To
Shari'a Threaten Human Rights? How Egypt's Constitutional Court Reconciles Islamic Law With The
Liberal Rule Of Law, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 379 (2006) (But even the authors concede that the most
secular friendly versions of Islamic jurisprudence do not define the field.). Id. at 394-413.
202. See LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY, Of Political States and "Soft" Religion as the Basis for

State Organization,available at http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com. As one set of commentators well described it:
Human rights organizations, women's organizations, academics, and journalists have focused
intently on the role of Islam in Iraq's constitution. Many commentators believe that it pervades the document, starting with the second Article, which makes Islam the official religion
of the state, and running through provisions on Iraq's identity, the need for future laws to be
consistent with the established provisions of Islam, personal status, and the existence of Sharia
scholars on the Supreme Court. Others have argued that the religion-related provisions are
too weak and ambiguous to have any substantial impact on their own. Still others, including
those in the U.S. government, have argued that the constitution is progressive in the Middle
East because it recognizes freedom of belief for all, and that it synthesizes Islam with the
internationally recognized principles of democracy and human rights.
Ashley S. Deeks & Matthew D. Burton, Iraq's Constitution: A Drafting History,40 CORNELLIIr'L L.J.

1, 5-6 (2007).
203. See Faiz Ahmed, Afghanistan's Reconstruction, Five Years Later: Narratives of Progress,
Marginalized Realities, and the Politics of Law in a TransitionalIslamic Republic, 10 GONZ. J. INT'L L.
269 (2007). Ahmed well (and mockingly) describes this narrative:
before the American intervention, Afghanistan lay enveloped in medieval barbarism and the
darkest of tyrannies. The moment of contact with Western civilization- initiated by the U.S.
and British bombing campaign that began on October 7, 2001-was the enlivening moment
that served as the necessary catalyst for progressive change. What follows is a story of upward
bound, unfailing progress-beginning with the formation of a transitional government at Bonn
in December of 2001, to the ratification of a new constitution and presidential elections in
2004, and most recently, country-wide parliamentary elections in September 2005. Freedom,
human rights, and the rule of law, so the story goes on, are inevitable products of these auspicious political developments.
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But their constitutions share more in common with the spirit of the
Cairo Declaration and the Iranian Constitution than with the earlier products of American intervention after the Second World War and then after
the fall of the Soviet Union. Whatever the suggestions to the contrary, and
whatever the niceties of the parsing of the language of the text (in English),
the legal orders established by the constitutions are subordinated to the
overarching legal/moral/ethical system of Islam. These differences have significant effect on the foundations of constitutional ordering. The United
States Constitution is an expression of the will of the people of the United
States, self constituted as a union. 0 4 The Japanese Imperial Constitution
was an expression of the will of the Imperial Household. The Iraqi Constitution is grounded in a different relationship between the polity and the
state. The constituting framework of the Iraqi Constitution is declared
"[i]n the name of God, the most merciful, the most compassionate, 2 °5 and
which can be elaborated only by "[a]cknowledging God's right over us, and
in fulfillment of the call of our homeland and citizens, and in response to
the call of our religious and national leaderships and the determination of
our great (religious) authorities and of our leaders and reformers.... 206
Only on that basis might "[w]e the people of Iraq of all components and
shades" take it upon "to draft, through the values and ideals of the heavenly messages and the findings of science and man's civilization, this lasting
constitution. '2 7 The place of human rights guarantees within this framework is highly contested, at least in the West.20 8
The Afghani Constitution, in contrast, appears to speak more clearly
the language of transnational constitutionalism.2 °9 It speaks to the constitutive acts of the people of Afghanistan, grounded in the international system of human rights, and a desire to regain "Afghanistan's deserving place
in the international community., 210 These sentiments echo those in the
Id. at 270-71.
204. Thus, the Preamble to the American Constitution provides for its creation by its constituting
sovereigns, the people. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. Of course, their was no consensus on the meaning of
this descriptor-did it mean the people constituted as states or the people of the several states aggregated into a single constituency?-until 1865, and even today, the issue causes some discomfort among
the members of the Supreme Court. See Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
205. Iraqi Constitution, Draft Document, to Be Presented to Voters Saturday, Preamble, WASH.
POST, Oct. 12, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR
2005101201450.html.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See Mohamed Y. Mattar, Unresolved Questions In The Bill Of Rights Of The New Iraqi
Constitution:How Will The Clash Between Human Rights" And "Islamic Law" Be Reconciled In Future
Legislative Enactments And Judicial Interpretations?,30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 126 (2006).
209. Constitution of Afghanistan 1382 [2004], available at http://www.junbish.org/constitution-of-

afghanistan-yea.htm.
210. Id. at pmbl. Thus, the Preamble declares a number of now conventional objectives of the
constitution including:

"[O]bserving the United Nations Charter and respecting the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, For consolidating national unity, safeguarding independence, national sovereignty,
territorial integrity of the country, For establishing a government based on people's will
democracy, For creation of a civil society free of oppression, atrocity, discrimination, and
lence and based on the rule of law, social justice, protection of human rights, and dignity,

and
and
vioand
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German and Japanese post War constitutions.2 1' Yet it also presents a similar acknowledgment of the boundaries of self-constitution proclaiming21 a2
constitution "[in the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.,
The Preamble only then continues with an acknowledgement to the centrality of the people to the project of constituting the state, but then
grounds that acknowledgment within the structural limitations and framework of Islam. "We the people of Afghanistan: With firm faith in God
Almighty and relying on His lawful mercy, and Believing in the Sacred
religion of Islam. ' 213 And, more honestly, perhaps, than in the Iraqi effort,
the Afghani Constitution also acknowledged the constraints under which it
was possible to create a constitution for the nation. It acknowledged that
adoption could only be effected "in214compliance with historical, cultural,
and social requirements of the era.
Like the German Constitution, the Afghani Constitution preserves
against constitutional change, the core values of its legal order. In the case
of Germany, those core values include democracy, human rights, and the
federal character of the German State.2 15 In the case of the Afghani state,
the focus is on a different set of core values: "The provisions of adherence
to the fundamentals of the sacred religion of Islam and the regime of the
Islamic Republic cannot be amended." '1 6 Thus both the mimicry of transnational constitutional forms and its application to wholly different effect.
The suggestion is not that it is a bad thing necessarily, only that it tends, by
its practice, to diminish (and perhaps threaten) the universality of the principles of transnational secular constitutionalism through which it has derived its legitimacy.
But we are also reminded that "[w]hile references to Islam are customary and appropriate, attention should be devoted to clauses that give some
specificity to Islam's official status. Islam must be enshrined in a way that it
is expressed through normal democratic mechanisms, rather than supplanting them. ' 21 7 The effective difference of theologically based systems,
contrasted with those founded on secularist principles of transnational constitutionalism become more apparent when one moves beyond the hortatory expressions of the Constitutions and looks to their concrete
application within the body of each constitution. It is hard to read around
ensuring the fundamental rights and freedoms of the people, For strengthening of political,
social, economic, and defensive institutions of the country, For ensuring a prosperous life, and
sound environment for all those residing in this land."
Id.
211. See discussion supra section II.B.
212. Constitution of Afghanistan 1382 [2004], supra note 209, at pmbl.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See Grundgesetz, supra, at art. 79. See also, Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) (Federal
Constitutional Court) Oct.. 12, 1993, 89 Entscheidungen des Bundeseverfassungsgerichts (BVerfG) 155
(F.R.G.), translatedin 1 CMLR 57 (1994); 33 ILM 388 (1994).
216. Constitution of Afghanistan 1382 [2004], supra note 209, at ch. 10 art. 1.
217. Khaled M. Abou El Fad), et. al., Democracy and Islam in the New Constitution of Afghanistan, Conference Report of the Center for Asia Pacific Policy, 2003, available at http://www.rand.org/
pubs/conf.proceedings/2005/CF186.pdf.
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the provision of the Afghani constitution that proclaims: "In Afghanistan
no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion
of Islam. ' '2 18 The Iraqi Constitution declares to similar affect that:
First: Islam is the official religion of the State and it is a
fundamental source of legislation:
A. No law that contradicts the established provisions of Islam may be established.
B. No law that contradicts the principles of democracy
may be established.
C. No law that contradicts the rights and basic freedoms
stipulated in this constitution may be established.2 19
While some American commentators suggest that this is a soft form of
the "hard" theocracy in Iran and therefore amenable to transnational constitutional norms, 220 others suggest that the text of these constitutions can
be read to the same effect.22 1
And more, these constitutions subordinate non-Muslim peoples to the
socio-moral-legal system of Islam. For the Muslim, in Iraq, there is a unity
between law, religion, and society. The State privileges Islam and the
Arab, both of which together serve as the foundation of State identity and
governance: "Second: This Constitution guarantees the Islamic identity of
the majority of the Iraqi people and guarantees the full religious rights of
all individuals to freedom of religious belief and practice such as Christians,
218.
219.
220.
And Text
221.

Constitution of Afghanistan 1382 [2004], supra note 209, at ch. 1 art. 3.
See Constitution of Iraq, infra note 222, at art. 2.
See Noah Feldman & Roman Martinez, A New ConstitutionalOrder? ConstitutionalPolitics
In The New Iraq: An Experiment In Islamic Democracy, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 883 (2006).
A recent comment makes an excellent point on this score:

The Iranian constitution parallels the Iraqi Constitution with its two significant protectionist
clauses, one protecting Islam and the other democratic principles. Article 4 in the Iranian
constitution states that Islamic principles apply absolutely and generally to all articles of the
Constitution, thus providing a concrete foundation for Islam. Article 6 in the Iranian Constitution protects democracy in providing that elections and public opinion will govern the administration of affairs. However, even though Article 6 provides a basis for democratic
principles, in practice Article 4 assumes a significant portion of power and authority in Iran.
Therefore, although Iraq does not permit Islam the same dominating presence as Iran in other
sections of the Constitution, an expansive, broad interpretation of Iraq's Article 2 could allocate Islam as much authority as Iran's Article 4.
Forest Hansen, Note, The Iraqi Constitution: Upholding Principles Of Democracy While Struggling To
Curtail The Dangers Of An Islamic Theocracy,12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 256, 279-280 (2006);
accord, Jason Lawrence Reimer, Comment, Finding Their Own Voice? The Afghanistan Constitution:
Influencing The Creation Of A Theocratic Democracy, 25 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 343 (2006) ("The
Afghanistan Constitution reflects the nation's determination to value Islam over western values and
democratic thought." Additionally, the comment concludes that the Afghanistan Constitution's blending of theocracy and democracy will lead to its ultimate failure."). Id. But see, Kristen A. Stilt, Islamic
Law And The Making And Remaking Of The Iraqi Legal System, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 695,
698 (2004) ("The Iraqi population's diverse political, religious, and ethnic affiliations suggest that agreement will come only through negotiation and compromise among many different views, making the
prevalence of any one extreme view on the role of Islamic law in the new Iraq unlikely."). Id.
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Yazedis, and Mandi Sabeans. ' 222 For the Christian, Yazedis and Mani
Sabeans there is tolerance, but no social legal equality. Jews have been
erased from the constitution, though not from the consciousness of Islam,
whose core religious sources of theology, morals, ethics and law are laced
with
references to that religion and the people who continue to adhere to
it.223 These minorities are "possessed" by the majority, tolerated and protected, as long as they behave-and that is the entirety of the protections
accorded them. 224 But ultimately, the expectation is assimilation through
conversion.
The Afghani Constitution provides a similar framework of privileging
Islam not only as state religion, but also of placing Islam at the apex of a
hierarchical system of toleration. Thus, "[t]he religion of the state of the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is the sacred religion of Islam. ' '225 By definition, Islam provides the behavioral template for appropriate behavior
with which the state may not interfere. In contrast, other religions acquire
a more modest degree of toleration. "Followers of other religions are free
to exercise their faith and perform their religious rites within the limits of
the provisions of law."' 2 26 The practical effect has tended to privilege religion as the basis for social and political organization in a way that may be
227
troubling in the West.
The symbolism attached to the state reinforces this foundational
choice. The Afghani flag, for example, is laced with symbols of Islamic
hegemony. 2 28 So is the Afghani national anthem 2 29-and not merely with
vague references to a fungible deity, as exemplified by the American
222. Constitution of Iraq 2005, available at http://www.iraqigovernment.org/Content/Biography/
English/constitution.html.
223. Quanuni Assassi Jumhuri'I Isla'mai Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran]
1358 [1980], arts. 13, 14. (For a description of the Islamic basis of the relationship with non-Muslims
written into Constitutional law see Article 14.) Ironically, The Iranian Constitution recognizes only
Zoroastrians, Jews and Christians. Id. at art 14. Toleration is explicit in Iran. Article 14 both provides
for treatment of non-Muslims "in conformity with ethical norms and the principles of Islamic justice
and equity, and to respect their human rights." On the other hand, such toleration ends where such
minorities conspire or engage in activities "against Islam and the Islamic Republic of Iran." Id. Technically, any political activity on the part of non-Muslims not specifically approved could serve as a basis
for the violation. Id.
224. There are lots of socio-cultural clues to these expressions of possession and subordination. It
was common in the West to conceive of Jewish people in the possessive, as wards of some or another
portion of the state apparatus, or as strangers. See, e.g., Daniel H. Cole, Symposium On The Constitution Of The Republic Of Poland- Part 11, 1998 ST. LouIS-WARSAw TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 1, 9 (1998); cf.
Thomas Aquinas, De Regimine Judaeorum, in AQUINAS: SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS 84 (A.P.

D'Entr~ves ed. & John G. Dawson trans., 1970). Certain leaders in the modern Middle East continue
this tradition. Transcript, President Ahmadinejad Delivers Remarks at Columbia University, CQ Transcripts Wire, September 24, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dyn/content/article/
2007/09/24/AR2007092401042.html ("We love all nations. We are friends with the Jewish people. There
are many Jews in Iran, leaving peacefully, with security."). Id.
225. Constitution of Afghanistan 1382 [2004], supra note 209, at ch. 1 art. 2.
226. Id.
227. See Larry Cati Backer, Constitution and Apostasy in Afghanistan, LAW AT THE END OF THE
DAY, March 28, 2006, available at http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2006/03/constitution-and-apostasyin.html.
228. Constitution of Afghanistan 1382 [2004], supra note 201, at ch. 1 art. 20 ("The national insignia of the state of Afghanistan is composed of Mehrab and pulpit in white color. In addition, in the
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pledge of allegiance. 230 And the presidential oath of office emphasizes the
religious character of the state. 231 But there are also significant effect on
the construction of democratic organization and governance as well. For
example, under the Afghani Constitution, the right to form political parties
of any stripe is guaranteed,23 2 as long as the "program and charter of the
party are not contrary to the principles of sacred religion of Islam." 233 That
a similar provision in the West might well constitute a violation of basic
human and political rights merely underscores the magnitude of effect that
a choice of foundational constitutional framework has had on the constitution of the character of democratic organization in Afghanistan. 234 And
indeed, the constitution imposes on the state a positive obligation to further the inculcation of Islam, Islamic religion and values, on the population
through education.2 3 5 Islamic values also shape the state's responsibility to
the family under the Afghani Constitution. 36 Yet the morality clauses of
upper-middle part of the insignia the sacred phrase of 'There is no God but Allah and Mohammad is his
prophet, and Allah is Great' is placed, along with a rising sun."). Id.
229. Id. (providing that the "National Anthem of Afghanistan shall be in Pashtu and mention
'Allahu Akbar' and the names of the ethnic groups of Afghanistan.").
230. That symbols matter, and symbolic speech raises emotive issues touching on core notions of
self identity were made clear in the recent litigation in the United States over the insertion of the words
"under God" in the pledge of allegiance recited in the United States. The case is particularly interesting
for the context in which the issue arose-a domestic battle by divorcing parents over the custody of
their offspring served as the setting for the issue. It is not clear whether the issue was a means to an
ends (punishing the spouse and securing custody) or an independent value issue. Yet, the context suggests the mundane aspects of life in which grave issues of core normative values can arise. See William
Branigin and Charles Lane, Supreme Court Dismisses Pledge Case on Technicality Justices Do Not Decide Constitutionality of Reference to God in Pledge of Allegiance, THE WASH. POST, June 14, 2004,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A40279-2004Jun14.html.
231. See Constitution of Afghanistan 1382 [20041, supra note 201, at ch. 3 art 4 ("In the name
Allah, the Merciful, the Compassionate In the name God Almighty, in the presence of you representatives of the nation of Afghanistan, I swear to obey and safeguard the provisions of the sacred religion of
Islam .... ). Scholars have noted the way that theocratic constitutionalism privileges members of a
plural polity through the imposition of religious tests of a variety of sorts-including the use of oaths.
"The constitutions of a number of predominantly Muslim countries may restrict to Muslim citizens the
right to serve in government positions, particularly to hold executive power. This is achieved by requiring a specific Islamic oath or by stipulating that only Muslims can hold a given position." Tad Stahnke,
Robert C. Blitt, The Religion-State Relationship And The Right To Freedom Of Religion Or Belief A
Comparative Textual Analysis Of The Constitutions Of Predominantly Muslim Countries 36 GEO. J.
INT'L L. 947, 974 (2005). The constitutional traditions of several Western states continue a similar practice-especially in Latin America. See, e.g., Argentine Constitution Part I,. Ch. 1, Sec. 2 (The Federal
Government supports the Roman Catholic Apostolic religion) available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/
Constitutions/Argentina/argen94_e.html.
232. Constitution of Afghanistan 1382 [2004], supra note 201, at ch. 2, art 14.
233. Id.
234. Id. Interestingly, while a religious political party might be formed, as long as it is Islamic, no
such party can be formed under the Afghani Constitution if it is based on an "Islamic School of
thought. Formation and functioning of a party based on ethnicity, language, Islamic school of thought
(mazhab-i fiqhi) and region is not permissible."). Id.
235. See Constitution of Afghanistan 1382 [2004], supra note 201, at ch. 2 art. 23 ("The state shall
devise and implement a unified educational curriculum based on the provisions of the sacred religion of
Islam, national culture, and in accordance with academic principles, and develops the curriculum of
religious subjects on the basis of the Islamic sects existing in Afghanistan.").
236. See Constitution of Afghanistan 1382 [2004], supra note 201, at ch. 2 art. 32 ("The state
adopts necessary measures to ensure ... upbringing of children and the elimination of traditions contrary to the principles of sacred religion of Islam."). Id.
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the Iraqi constitution is said to be a milder version of its Iranian and Saudi
counterparts.2 37

Moreover, the Afghani Constitution reinforces the Islamic character
of the legal order constituted through its structuring of the judiciary. The

criteria for the selection of judges are meant to emphasize the Islamic character of the legal basis of the state.2 38 While the Supreme Court may "review compliance with the Constitution of laws, legislative decrees,

international treaties, and international conventions, and interpret them, in
accordance with the law", 2 39 the court must apply Islamic law directly
under certain circumstances.24 ° Yet it must also be remembered that this
superstructure of theocratic constitutionalism suits atop an ancient and
complex system of formal and informal decision making, some of which is
more intensely "Islamic" and others less

so.

2 41

And, indeed, we are told,

that Afghani traditional elites have been actively resisting the Westernization of their law at the subconstitutional level, in favor of the more tradi-

tional Iranian model, for some time.24 2 The Iraqi Constitution paves a

similar road but in a more subtle fashion. It is important more for what it
does not provide than for its brief statement on the issues. The Iraqi Constitution vests the Federal Supreme Court with independence and provides
237. As one commentator concludes:
"The morality clause is interpreted differently in a country like Iran, which makes it the function of the state to impose certain rules of morality. Const. Iran art. 8. Article 8 of the Iranian
Constitution states: In the Islamic Republic of Iran, al 'amr bilma'ruf wa al-nahy 'an
al'munkar' [Enjoin the good and forbid the evil] is a universal and reciprocal duty that must
be fulfilled by the people with respect to one another, by the government with respect to the
people, and by the people with respect to the government." Id. Similarly, in Saudi Arabia,
"[t]he state protects Islam; it implements its Shari'ah; it orders people to do right and shun
evil; it fulfills the duty regarding God's call."
Mohamed Y. Mattar, Unresolved Questions In The Bill Of Rights Of The New Iraqi Constitution: How
Will The Clash Between Human Rights" And "Islamic Law" Be Reconciled In Future Legislative Enactments And Judicial Interpretations?,30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 126, 146 & n. 122 (2006) (citing Basic Law
of Saudi Arabia, art. 23.).
238. See Constitution of Afghanistan 1382 [2004], supra note 201, at Ch. 7 art. 3 (specifying the
qualifications of Afghani Supreme Court justices as requiring "a higher education in law or in Islamic
jurisprudence"). Such judges "swear in the name of God Almighty to support justice and righteousness
in accord with the provisions of the sacred religion of Islam and the provisions of this Constitution and
other laws of Afghanistan." Id. at ch. 7 art . 4.
239. Constitution of Afghanistan 1382 [2004], supra note 201, at ch. 7 art. 6.
240. "When there is no provision in the Constitution or other laws regarding ruling on an issue,
the courts' decisions shall be within the limits of this Constitution in accord with the Hanafi jurisprudence." Constitution of Afghanistan 1382 [2004], supra note 201, at ch. 7 art. 15. Special provision is
made for the application of Shi'a law under certain circumstances. Id. at ch. 7, art. 16.
241. For an excellent analysis see Christina Jones-Pauly and Neamat Nojumi, Balancing Relations
Between Society and State: Legal steps Toward National Reconciliation and Reconstruction in Afghanistan, 52 AM. J. CoMp. L. 825 (2004).
242. See Faiz Ahmed, Afghanistan's Reconstruction, Five Years Later: Narratives of Progress,
MarginalizedRealities, and the Politics of Law in a TransitionalIslamic Republic, 10 GONZ. J. INT'L L.
269, 299 (2007) (suggesting the difficulty of elaborating at the sub-constitutional level the human rights
protections described in the Afghani Constitution in light of the opposition of traditionalist Islamic law
grounded elites).
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that its members shall be made up of a "number of judges, and experts in
Islamic jurisprudence and law experts" to be determined by law. 243
This form of state construction is by no means unique to Islam. It
parallels the ancient universalist strains in Western philosophy of law
grounded in the union of law and the divine, 2 " and echoes the notions of
governance in the Christian West before the Enlightenment and the construction of the Westpahlian system. 245 Ironically, though, Islamic openness
on this score, and the willingness of Iraqi elites' American overseers to
tolerate it, has emboldened a certain segment of Western elites who have
become more vocal about the same expectation in the West.24 6 Indeed, this
sort of basis of supra-constitutionalism has become a cornerstone of American policy as well, at least of the current Administration.

243. Constitution of Iraq 2005, at art. 91. It has the jurisdiction to oversee the constitutionality of
laws and regulations as well as to interpret the provisions of the Iraqi Constitution. Id. at art. 92. In
that respect, and in conjunction with Art. 2, the Federal Supreme Court might be said to operate as a
religious and secular court. A Higher Juridical Council is responsible for the management of the affairs
of the judiciary. Id. at art. 90.
244. "One god, one state, one law-this well known formula states the doctrine of the Stoics in a
clear and simple way .... All [people] are subject to the one God and the one law." CARL JOACHIM
FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 28 (2nd ed., 1963). For elaboration

in Roman law, see Id. at 30.
245. For a discussion of the philosophy of the law of state and religion before the Protestant
Reformation, see Id. at 35-43.
246. Ann Coulter, a famous elite celebrity on American television in her time, for example, suggested to her Jewish interviewer that things would work better in the United States if it were a Christian
nation, and that Jews would do well to come over since their conversion would "perfect" them.
"Earlier this week, Coulter went on 'The Big Idea,' a talk show aired on CNBC, the cable
channel devoted to business news .... Coulter was there to describe how she had - in our
vulgar commercial argot -'branded' herself. At one point, Deutsch asked her what an ideal
country would be like, and she replied that it would be one in which everyone was 'a Christian.' Deutsch, who happens to be Jewish, protested that Coulter was advocating his people's
elimination. She responded that she simply hoped to see Jews 'perfected' through conversion
to Christianity."
Tim Rutten, Coulter's Anti-Semitic Comment Too Dangerousto Ignore, The Los Angeles Times, Oct.
13, 2007 (Entertainment News, Regarding Media), available at http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/
news/la-et-ruttenl3octl3,0,1859447.column?coll=la-home-center. Sadly, Ms, Coulter has not been
keeping up with some of the more interesting expressions of Christian faith in its relations with Jews, at
least as expressed by Catholics hierarchs. "The Holy Father has stated this permanent reality of the
Jewish people in a remarkable theological formula, in his allocution to the Jewish community of West
Germany at Mainz, on November 17th, 1980: "the people of God of the Old Covenant, which has never
been revoked." Commission For Religious Relations With The Jews, Notes On The Correct Way To
PresentThe Jews And Judaism In PreachingAnd CatechesisIn The Roman Catholic Church, available at
http://www.vatican.va/roman curia/pontifical-councils/chrstunilrelations-jews-docs/rc-pc-chrstunidoc_19820306-jews-judaismen.html. Or perhaps she has rejected these teachings. It is hard to say.
And certain strains of fundamentalist Protestantism, of course, view the issue in an entirely different
light. See, e.g., Southern Baptist Convention, Resolution On Jewish Evangelism (June 1996), available
at http:lwww.sbc.net/resolutions/amResolution.asp?ID=655. Yet, whatever the source of Ms. Coulter's
religious belief, she continues to be rewarded by those for whom she performs or who hold her in some
regard. The point, however, is to highlight the parallelism between Islam and Christianity on this score
in the socio-political sphere. In the circles in which Ms. Coulter thrives, those views, like those of
people traveling in Osama bin Ladin's circles, are strongly held.
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This policy was first articulated in President Bush's Second Inaugural
address. President Bush suggested a substantial reworking of the international constitutionalist project begun by his predecessors of his grandfather's generation.
"Freedom, by its nature, must be chosen, and defended by
citizens, and sustained by the rule of law and the protection
of minorities. And when the soul of a nation finally speaks,
the institutions that arise may reflect customs and traditions
very different from our own. America will not impose our
own style of government on the unwilling. Our goal instead
is to help others find their own voice, attain their own freedom, and make their own way. "247
Effectively, the form of transnational constitutionalism was to be observed.
But its content would not be driven by a secular system of international
consensus as evidenced by the common traditions of the majority of states
or other international expressions of norms in law or custom. Instead, core
norms within transnational constitutionalism-and principally the adherence to democratic norms in state construction and government elaboration-would now serve to curtail the power of the community of states to
limit sovereign expressions of state constitutions by local sovereigns democratically constituted.
"But something happened between 1945 and the present
that began to be revealed after September 11, 2001. The
Second Iraq War finally brought the differences between
classical internationalism and the Bush administration into
sharp relief. In place of the structuralism of the United Nations systems, and the consolidation of political power
outside the nation, the Second Inaugural Address reveals
President Bush's revolutionary new project of internationalism - a state centered system founded on individual participation. In place of the post 1945 drive to transfer and
consolidate power over political and social communities that is, nations, ethnic and religious communities-within a
remote and elite international community, the President
suggests the consolidation of state centered political communities all operating under the same general set of framework norms - 'that every man and woman on this earth has
rights, and dignity, and matchless value, because2 4 8they bear
the image of the Maker of Heaven and earth.'
247. George Bush, Second Inaugural Address, Washington, D.C., Jan. 20, 2005, available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/inauguralU.
248. Larry Cati Backer, PresidentBush's Second InauguralAddress: A Revolutionary Manifesto
For InternationalLaw in Chaotic Times, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (April 1, 2006), available at
http:/flcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2006/04/president-bushs-second-inaugural.html.
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Like Iranian constitutionalists, modern American transnational constitutionalism would adhere to the form of constitutionalism but turn it in fundamental ways to serve different, and perhaps incompatible, objectives.
That the system in Iraq and Afghanistan can be clothed in the whispers of
the language of pluralism and post-colonial rhetoric of freedom from the
strictures of Western universalism adds a bit of ironic spice to the
enterprise.
This formal adherence and functional rejection of transnational constitutionalism is clearly evident in the reconstitution of democracy as a value
of state constitution. Under traditional transnational constitutionalism democracy served as a core value of state formation because it accorded with
fundamental notions of fair governance and gave expression to the values
of human dignity and equality. But it acquires its legitimacy and authority
within constitutionalism because the community of nations, through their
legal traditions and international expressions, have determined that this
principle ought to have constitutional value-along with a number of other
equally critical normative principles.But within Iranian theocratic constitutionalism, and its American variant (as written into the Iraqi and Afghani
and Iraqi constitutions), democracy serves as a sword, justifying national
interventions and peculiarities that can trump other values, including those
that are held to be fundamental by the community of nations. Thus the
forms are observed by the substance is altered and redirected.
This functional twisting is sourced in the rejection of a secular, consultative, organic and political source for fundamental values. The forms of
supra national constitutionalism is observed. Like modern supra-national
constitutionalism the Iraqi and Afghani constitutions locate the source of
the limits of political expression outside both the state and the sovereign
power of the people. But the functional effect is altogether different. Unlike modern supra-national constitutionalism both Iraqi and Afghani constitutions locate the source of extra constitutional restraint: beyond human
reach, under the interpretive control of a body of intermediaries that are
not necessarily part of the entire political community, nor directly accountable to that community. In the secular transnational constitutionalist context, the people must look to their constitutional traditions informed by the
consensus of international law norms, in the development of which she may
participate. In a universalist theocratic transnational constitutionalist context, the people must also look to their constitutional traditions informed
by the precepts of religion, which they might affect but only as members of
the religious community and to the extent permitted under the rules of that
community.
This change has strong effect especially on the legitimacy and extent of
protections accorded to the constellation of norms which under transnational constitutionalism are also the objects of structural limits on national
constitutionalism. This is particularly telling with respect to international
human rights norms and ideals. Under Iraqi and Afghani national constitutionalism, it is possible to view human rights as constituted as a
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subordinate system of norms subject to application only in line with superior framework of religious norms. Moreover, human rights is treated as
object of religious norms. But, it must be emphasized, that these constitutions are not elevating religion in general. Each elevates one particular institutionalized religious organization-its theology, ethics and morals as
constituted in its religious codes and laws-to what had been an aspirational universalist ambition.249 Thus, like its Iranian counterpart, and unlike American constitutionalism, one parochial religion is made universal
through its constitution as the supreme source of authority for the elaboration of a constitutional rule of law state.
Ironically (there is much irony in this turn of American constitutionalism projected abroad), this is the same defect that the post colonialist discourse suggests is at the heart of the UN driven secular universalism of
human rights constitutionalism. This suggests a fundamental incompatibility between the objectives of both transnational constitutional frameworks.
Democracy becomes tyranny, equality becomes tolerance, and rights discourse becomes subordinated to one overarching right-the right of a dominant religion to set the political baseline for state activity. Interestingly
enough, these views are quite compatible with the sort of American constitutional vision long espoused by certain living members of the American
Supreme Court.25°
A sense of where Iraqi and Afghani theocratic constitutionalism is going can be gleaned from the position of the Islamic democratic parties represented in the Iraqi constitution making process.25 ' Islam is identified as a
fundamental source of legislation. Feldman and Martinez characterize this
as a victory of sorts for the new face of Universalist religiously based democratic society. Indeed, Feldman attempts to bridge the theoretical chasm
between religious and human rights universalism within Islam like this:
Some people think that because God is sovereign in Islam,
the people can't be the ultimate decisionmakers in their
governance. There might be a difficulty in resolving the political power of the people and the sovereignty of God. But
at the theoretical level, I think it's possible to respond that
249. Iraq, for example, by the terms of its constitution, is subsumed as "part of the Islamic world."
Constitution of Iraq 2005, at art. 3. In a sense that can be deemed to subordinate Iraqi sovereignty to
the ethno religious system of that world in a way similar to that Member States of the European Union
are subsumed within that system. See, e.g., Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, Case 26/62, [1962] ECR 1 ("the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for
the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights"). Id. Clearly the analogy is not
perfect-the two systems, in character, history, scope and institutionalization, are quite distinct. Perhaps they are even incompatible. But the thrust of the participation in a greater system is not. And that
is the point, both Islam and the European Union-one through Divine command, the other through the
aggregate will of the participants thereto-each constitute a legal order which governs the rights, powers and obligations of its members.
250. See, e.g., EMPLOYMENT DivisION, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES OF OREGON V.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
251. See Feldman & Martinez, supra, at 901-918.
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in Islam, although God is sovereign, God's laws are still interpreted by humans, and day-to-day governance happens
by people, not by God. What's more, in democracy we believe there are some fundamental rights that transcend what
the people might or might not think was right at a given
point, like the right to life and liberty.
Others have suggested a similar framework, grounded in the notion of a
functional convergence distinct formal systems: that of Isalm and that of
secular universal human rights. Michael Schoiswohl argues, for example,
that the consolidation of Islamic constitutional jurisprudence in Afghanistan through the Afghani Supreme Court "promotes an application of Islam that is not in contravention of its human rights guarantees."2 5 This is
hard to square with reality, but at least offers the possibility of a plausible
response to criticism that Americans have become the greatest exporters of
theocratic constitutionalism since the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and are at
the forefront of those who would destroy the very system of secular, consensus based, organic, transnational constitutionalism that they helped create after the Second World War. But it still plainly reveals the conundrum
of a democratic system in which the "countermajoritarian difficulty" of
American constitutional law25 3 is not only magnified but also extracted
from the political system itself and constituted as a supreme extra governmental system of constitutional and normative control. As a check on this
formal ceding of supra-constitutional authority to an extra-constitutional
normative and governance system that may not include within its community all members of the polity, the proponents of these new constitutional
252. Michael Schoiswohl, The New Afghanistan Constitutionaland International Law: A LoveHate Affair, 4 INT'L J. OF CONST. L. 664, 671 (2006). He notes that any other interpretation under the
Afghani Constitution would impermissibly privilege Islam within the non contradiction clause of Art. 2
with the human rights standards specified in art. 3 of the Afghani Constitution. Yet, even he is unsure
of the plausibility of this formalist argument. However, a systematic interpretation in favor of constitutionalism cannot be taken for granted in practice. Rather it may be that in contentious cases, "the
Supreme Court as well as local courts would adopt interpretations that disregard human rights standards prescribed by international law, even though there are ways to interpret those standards as being
in line with Islamic principles." Id. He illustrates the difficulty with a look at obligations under the
United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Id. at
672-675.
253. See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); ALEXANDER
BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975). But the so-called countermajoritarian difficulty is itself
not without its own dfficulties, grounded in the relationship between law and the institutions of government. I have elsewhere argued, for example, that
Indeed, the so-called "countermajoritarian difficulty" that has enthralled several generations
of American legal and academic elites (Bickel 1962), and that has served as the basis for a
campaign to scare the electorate about the power of the judiciary (Bork 1990), reduces itself
to a twentieth century version of the perhaps more elegantly proffered argument of Francis
Bacon. Bickel and his disciples, like Francis Bacon, argue that lawyers and the courts ought to
exercise their authority under the authority of the sovereign. For Bacon, that sovereign too%,
the form of the King, for Bickel, that sovereign was the "people" through their elected representatives to which popular authority had been transferred.
Larry Cat Backer, Constitutionalism in the Muslim World: A Conversation With Noah Feldman, in 9
DEMOCRACY: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND EMERGING DEMOCRACIES 33, 34 (2004).
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systems focus on the functional limits of formal privileging of religion.
They suggest that politics will supply the practical antidote to and limits of
the normative system privileged.
Then there is the practical process of figuring out institutions within
the constitution that will mediate between Islamic and democratic values
when they might appear to outside observers to be in contention with each
other. 254 But it is not clear that as a formal practical matter, the sort of
factionalism envisioned by these apologists is possible even if conceivable
as a functional matter. If the universalism of the adherents of religious
supremacy are formally constituted as supreme within the constitutional
orders of Iraq and Afghanistan, then the American, Arab secularist and
Kurdish ethnic protectionist inspired temporary overlay will not matter
very much. Nor will a formal declaration of the applicability of universal
human rights values, in conformity with Islam. In these systems, religious
foundational values have been privileged and the secular system of human
rights must necessarily be read within its parameters. The result follows
from the basic pattern of transnational constitutionalism from which this
system is derived. Just as religion and its value systems are an object of
protection under secular transnational constitutionalism and its human
rights value systems, human rights will be an object of protection under
theocratic transnational constitutionalism and its specific religious system.
Unpacking the formal elements of Art. 2 of the 2005 Iraq Constitution
are particularly helpful on this score. Islam is the state religion. While state
religions, as such, may not infringe on the rights of minority religious
groups, it does from a textual perspective, privilege one religion, and its
theology, morals and ethics, over all others. This may make it impossible
for any deviation for the majority peoples. Islam is identified as a fundamental source of legislation. This is a compromise provision from the ultimate expression of this position in Constitutional law: Islam is the only
source of legislation.
These normative values are reinforced through the Non-Contradiction
Clauses of Article 2: There are three non-contradiction clauses included in
separate sub parts to Article 2. Together they provide that no law can be
established that contradicts (1) the established principles of Islam, (2) the
principles of democracy, or (3) the rights and basic freedoms stipulated in
the constitution. Feldman and Martinez suggest that the three create an
opposition sufficient to protect individual liberties against a more purely
theocratic privileging of Islam. 55 However, the Islamists within Iraq could
make a strong case for the opposite-that the three non contradiction
clauses together are supreme, but that, given the focus on Islam, both the
254.
255. Feldman & Martinez supra at 904. "As a practical matter, these clauses raise the possibility
that future interpretations of the Islamic noncontradiction clause would be influenced by the principle
of democracy, whatever these may be defined to constitute. In any case, it cannot be maintained that
the text of the constitution privilege Islam over basic rights or democratic principles, however uneasily
they might sit beside each other under certain circumstances." Id.
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democratic and rights non contradiction clauses must be read within the
general parameters of Islamic morals, ethics and law. An Islamist reading
of the sort suggested would not be peculiar, even within the understanding
of Western judicial constitutional discourse. It could, for example, be said
to parallel the reading in the much-celebrated German Southwest Case. 5 6
So what would the non-American vetted Iraq Constitution look like?
It might look like this: Islam is the source of all law. All law that contradicts Islam contradicts the Constitution. Authoritative Islamic law scholars
must sit on the highest court, which merges secular and religious law. Individual, religious, democratic and human rights are respected within the
context of the Islamic identity of the state. Group but not individual rights
to conscience will be respected-a right to change religion will be permitted only to the extent permitted by the religious community from which the
individual seeks to exit (best case) or permitted only in favor of conversion
to Islam.
Within this constitutional framework, religion is no longer an object
with which a political community must deal. Instead, religion serves as the
foundation on which political communities are constituted. Religion thus
serves as the 'higher law' that limits the constitutional expression of a polity: (1) exists outside the state; (2) beyond the control of any state or its
apparatus, (3) it is eternal; (4) it is autonomous and complete in itself as a
moral, ethical, theological and legal system; (5) comes with an institutional
apparatus for its implementation and expression as behavior norms.2 57
Yet it must be emphasized that his basis of religious constitution is not
merely an expression of parochial Islamic worldviews. Similar seeds, for
example, lie in places like the Catholic catechism,2 58 or in Hindu nationalist
expressions.259 And it is well known that elements of religion and religious
practice, as well as a symbiosis between religion and the state is, in the
West, as old as the execution of Socrates.

VI.

DRAWING MORALS AND CONSEQUENCES:

A

FIRST ATTEMPT

The rise of this alternative form of infusing constitutions with morals
and ethics will have potentially great consequences. At the macro level, it
256. For a discussion, see Arthur T. von Mehren, Constitutionalism in Germany-The First Decision of the New ConstitutionalCourt, 1 AM. J. CoMp. L. 70 (1952).
257. This, of course, is a thrust of the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, supra, available at http://www.religlaw.org/interdocs/docs/cairohrislam1990.htm, which long redated the American
efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
258. See, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH (Doubleday 1995), 1$ 1878-1948 (The Person
and Society) and 1 2419-2442 (The Social Doctrine of the Church; Economic Activity and Social
Justice; Justice and Solidarity Among Nations). This is a complex subject outside immediate scope of
these remarks, but note 1 2242 ("The citizen is obliged in conscience not to follow the directives of civil
authorities when they are contrary to the demands of the moral order, to the fundamental rights of
persons or the teachings of the Gospel") and 912244 (suggesting that societies based on normative
orders that do not recognize a divine moral order "arrogate to themselves an explicit or implicit totalitarian power over man and his destiny.").
259. See, e.g., CHETAN Bi-rr, HINDI NATIONALISM:ORIGINS, IDEOLOGIES AND MODERN MYTs
99-102, 179-209 (2001).
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suggests that, in the future, at least two sources of normative constitutional
foundations will be competing for influence in the construction of constitutions for political communities. It might follow that constitutional convergence becomes more difficult. Indeed, conflict over constitutional ideology
may represent, in the 21st century, what conflicts over economic ideology
represented for much of the 20th century.
As the example from the European Union suggests, that competition
can produce attempts to rethink the substantive grounding of new constitutional orders. It might provide a basis for rethinking the substantive basis
of old constitutional orders - for example the United States, even without
the bother of constitutional amendment. There are leaders within the
United States that have already advanced this idea: The United States, like

Iraq, should recover its roots as a religious state with a plural but common
grounding in Christianity,26 ° which must form, as it once had, the basis of
its law making. 261 The political branches in the United States have attempted, from time to time, to advance this notion.262 It is possible to construct a jurisprudence of tolerance based on a religious hierarchy grounded
in predominance in the general population.263
The greatest consequence on a macro level may well be the effect of
competition on the great state centered project of constructing a universal
set of norms for constitution making. The rise of competitor universalizing
systems threatens the hegemony of the great secular project of behavior
norm construction centered on public international law that had provided

the basis for constitutionalism for over a generation. But this competition

260. Christianity, like Islam and Judaism, can claim a number of distinct sects, which shall significant elements of morals, ethics and theology.
261. See, e.g., Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 343 (1890).
262. There have been a variety of demonstrations of local political will to return to a more religiously oriented political framework within the United States. For example, the Missouri Legislature
declared the Christian origins of the state. In the spirit of the Iraqi Constitution, Missouri legislators in
Jefferson City considered a bill that would name Christianity the state's official "majority" religion.
House Concurrent Resolution 13 has is pending in the state legislature .... The resolution would recognize "a Christian god," and it would not protect minority religions, but protect the majority's right to
express their religious beliefs. The resolution also recognizes that, "a greater power exists," and only
Christianity receives what the resolution calls, "justified recognition." H.R. 13, 93RD LEG., 2D REG,
SESS. (Mo. 2006).
John Mills, State Bill Proposes Christianityto be Missouri's Official Religion, KMOV.com (March
4, 2006), available at http://www.kmov.com/topstories/stories/030206ccklrKmovreligionbill.7d361c3f.
html. The Kentucky legislature made a number of similar declarations in support of the display of the
Decalogue which was the subject of McCreary case. See also McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct.
2722, 2753 (2005).
263. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2748 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). "Expanding
on the hints he made in Mitchell, Justice Scalia here advances his notion that the Establishment Clause
permits the state to favor one religion over another, as long as the formal requisites of neutrality are
met (assuming that true neutrality is impossible) and offering members of non majority religions the
solace of the Free Exercise Clause." Larry CatS Backer, On the Cusp of Great Changes: American
Religion Clause Jurisprudence in the First Decade of the 21st Century, LAw AT THE END OF THE DAY
(Nov. 25, 2006), available at http:/llcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2006/11/on-cusp-of-great-changesamerican.html.
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constitutionalism
pits traditional constitutionalism, international secular
264
and the new theological universalist constitutionalism.
At the micro level, the embrace of one transcendental system of constitutional values over others can have substantial consequences as well on
rule of law constitutionalism in both its aspects. In its substantive aspects
constitutional religious transcendentalism can redefine the scope of protection of religious minorities and those who otherwise reject the transcendence of the belief system grounding the constitution. As a source of
constitutional normative foundation, this shift can as well affect the substantive right to religious expression within the polity - from a protection
of religious rights in general 265 to the protection of religious rites.2 66 These
movements would mark a return to the sensibilities of a time when Reynolds26 7 and Davis268 were the foundations of the American judiciary's understanding of the relationship between religion and the apparatus of the
state.2 69 The future of American constitutional jurisprudence may well
have been illuminated by the American approaches to the religious problem in Afghanistan and Iraq, and its transplantation back to the United
States. Justice Scalia, may have outlined the language of that transplantation, for example, speaking in his dissent in McCreary County.27 °
In its process aspect, the embrace suggests a potential for transfers of
governance authority. In essence, the countermajoritarian difficulty well
known to modern constitutional law, will acquire a more complicating dimension. On one level, democratic theory must deal with the problem of
264. For a discussion of the competition between the first two within the United States, see Vicki
Jackson, Constitutionsas 'Living Trees' Comparative ConstitutionalLaw and Interpretive Metaphors,75
FORDHAM L. REV. 921 (2006).

265. Perhaps the Court might be emboldened to continue its reconstruction of U.S. Const.
Amend. 1, to a provision that requires accommodation of majority religious practices, beliefs and
norms, and a toleration of others, in the manner of the Iraqi Constitution. Justice Scalia, after all, has
already made it clear that this, effectively, is the substantive framework driving his Establishment and
Free Exercise analysis. See, e.g., Employment Div. Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
874 (1990). For a discussion of the recent transformation of the American Religion Clauses, see Larry
CatA Backer, On the Cusp of Great Changes: American Religion Clause Jurisprudencein the First Decade of the 21st Century, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Nov. 25, 2006), available at http://lcbacker-

blog.blogspot.coml2006/11/on-cusp-of-great-changes-american.html.
266. As has become clear-the thrust of religious toleration under the theocratic constitutions of
Iraq and Afghanistan protects the preservation of religious rites (as long as they might not offend
Islam) but cannot serve as a basis for the protection of religious rights independent of the toleration
framework permitted under Islam. See Afghani Const. Ch. 1, Art. 1; Iraqi Constitution Arts. 39, Art. 40
(protection of individual religious expression). And, of course, religious toleration then shifts-from
constitutional discourse involving value judgments of the polity in the context of global expression of
appropriate institutional behavior, to a religious discourse within Islam. The extent and expression of
the rights of non-Muslims, within Iraq and Afghanistan are to be determined by the Muslim majority.
But this is precisely Scalia's point in Smith as well. Thus, from an American perspective, an ironic
congruence using two distinct jurisprudential frameworks.
267. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
268. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
269. See Larry Cati Backer, On the Cusp of Great Changes: American Religion Clause Jurisprudence in the First Decade of the 21st Century, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Nov. 25, 2006), availableat

http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com2006/1 1/on-cusp-of-great-changes-american.html.
270. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
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unelected judges with power to interpret national constitutions. On another level, states must also deal with the effect of transferring norm making power from out of the state either to the internationals community
(global human rights system) or to a priesthood or other body of people
charged with interpreting Holy Writ or Divine pronouncement (priests,
ministers, imams, etc.). Ironically, theocratic constitutionalism solves the
countermajoritarian difficulty directly-by providing a Divine dispensation
from popular control through a theology that vests a priestly caste with
authority to act in matters of state and religion (inextricably intertwined). 271 Divine command effectively solved the problem of representation and legitimated the transfer of power to the priestly caste in Iran. It
serves a similar purpose in Afghanistan and Iraq.272 There is little reason
to suppose that such a leap of faith cannot be undertaken among other
institutionalized religious establishments, as each, invited to participate in
the religious aspects of political affairs, provides a divinely inspired basis
for the transfer of authority from the people to the priestly caste. And,
indeed, the Anglo-American judicial system is already receptive to those
patterns of justification of authority transfers.273
Whatever the results, democracy and republicanism might have be to
reconceived under a system in which the highest expression of national political will - the constitution - is subject to a transcendent set of norms in

the application and implementation of which some but not all of the polity
may participate. The rise of theocratic transnational constitutionalism
ought to remind the student of constitutionalism of the parochialism of
even the most aspirationally lofty and apparently disconnected system of
universals.
271. As Chibli Mallat recently explained with respect to Islam: "As for the problem of Islamic law
being prevented from change because it is God's law-as the political expression of the 'closing the gate
of ijtihad', the issue has been for all societies, including those professing allegiance to Islam, a matter of
'the ultimate interpreter.' In this context present crises surrounding democracy tend to get befuddled.
The problem is not so much the issue of whether man or God makes the law, but which of the many
competing men, and more rarely women, are empowered to interpret it." Chibli Mallat, On The Specificity Of Middle Eastern Constitutionalism,38 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 13, 29 (2006). For the analogue
in the secular law systems of the West, see Larry Cati Backer, Retaining JudicialAuthority: A Preliminary Inquiry on the Dominion of Judges, 12 WM & MARY BILL OF RTS J. 117 (2003).

272. Thus, it has been explained that "Khomeini's doctrine of veldyat-e faqth contended that as
deputes of the Hidden Imam (the twelth Imam who went into occultation in A.D. 873), the boundaries
of authority of the 'ulamd' during the Imam's gheibat (absence) included absolute rule over the believers. Khomeini argued that various hadths had established the jurists as the valf-ye amr (guardian of
affairs) who possessed the qualifications necessary to serve as deputies during the absence of the Hidden Imam."
Said Saffari, The Legitimation of the Clergy's Right to Rule in the Iranian Constitution of 1979,
20(1) BRIT. J. OF MIDDLE E. STUD. 64, 65 (1993).
273. See discussion in Larry CatA Backer, Retaining JudicialAuthority: A Preliminary Inquiry on
the Dominion of Judges, 12 WM & MARY BILL OF RTS J. 117 (2003). Substitution priests for judges or
adding priests into the judicial mix might not change the patterns of judging in the United States as
much as might otherwise be assumed. As long as there is an authoritative justification (for the Americans within their constitutional structure-and I have suggested the movement in that direction) the
patterns of institutional action would have to be only little modified to effect the change. That, perhaps, might also explain the ease with which American academics could slip into a system of judicial
review subject to a priestly overview.
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GOD(S) OVER CONSTITUTIONS

None of these men thought of Europe in merely local terms,
but generalized it into a representative of the universal. The
principle of generalization may have changed: Roman civilization (and law), Christianity, the 'humanity' of the Enlightenment, science and capitalism in the nineteenth, modernity
in the twentieth and globalization in the twenty-first century. It is hard to tell these ideas apart. They all claim the
status of an Esperanto, transcending the time and place in
which they are spoken.2 74
To this list of European universals can now be added Islam (and more
generally, religion, including but not now limited to Christianity).2 75 Each
universalism is by definition proof of the falsity of other universalisms.
Thus, the Iraqi and Afghani Constitutions present us with a reality in which
at least three fundamental systems of constitutionalism are now competing
for legitimacy, authority-and powerful adherents. They are, at their core,
irreconcilable. "How differently the Americans see the world!"27' 6 The
Americans have been instrumental in creating two of them-transnational
secular constitutionalism grounded now in the United Nations system, and
transnational theocratic constitutionalism, in which the state apparatus
bows to one of any possible number of parochial (now universalist) religious constitutions. And yet the Americans, like the governing apparatus in
the People's Republic of China continue to adhere to a more ancient form
of national constitutionalism, grounded in the power of national sovereigns
to assert unrestricted power in the constitution of their own political communities. The future of constitutionalism, whether national, secular or religious transnational form, is now dynamic indeed.

274. Martti Koskenniemi, internationalLaw in Europe: Between Traditionand Renewal, 16 EUR.
L. 113, 114 (2005).
275. This is a revolutionary addition from a European perspective. See Id. at 115 ("in 1880, Sir
Travers Twiss noted that the Koran - unlike the Bible - prohibited equality between the House of Islam
and the infidel states and that thus 'Ia civilisation turque sera toujours incompatible avec la notre"').
Though it is hardly revolutionary when one applies the criteria for universality without the privilege of
a parochial European (or American) context.
276. Id. at 117. This is true enough, but hardly in the way that Koskenniemi would have us believe. He views the United States through very European lenses-always sensitive to the behavior of
empires. Id. at 117-118. But while the United States might push universal values, it has rarely if ever
done so in the manner of European imperial universalism.
J. INT'L

